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REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF NONPROFIT
ASSOCIATIONS IN A
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
BarbaraK. Bucholtzt
Dans les pays dimocratiques, la science de la association est la science mere.'
INTRODUCTION
American media are awash in news items pertaining to the nonprofit
sector.2 Some of these articles relate stories of episodic scandals within
this sector-the kind that recur with daunting regularity and chronicle
the vagaries of human nature. 3 However, much of the media coverage
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. This article was
supported by a grant from the University of Tulsa. The author is indebted to Martin Belsky
and Linda Lacey for their comments on the text.
1 A.
ImsDE TOCQJEv'iLLE, 2 DEMocRAcy rN AMERICA 517 (J. P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1966) (1840) ("In democratic countries knowledge of how
to combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge ....
Tocqueville adds, "on its
progress depends that of all the others.").
2 This sector is variously described as the "Independent Sector," the 'Third Sector", the
"Not-for-Profit Sector," "nonprofit organizations" and "tax-exempt (or "exempt") organizations.". They are generally encompassed by the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) at
Title 26, Section 501(c), which exempts the listed organizations from federal income taxes if
they meet the statutory criteria. As a broad-brush description, the listed organizations are
considered "nonprofits" because they are organized for some purpose other than generating
profits-a purpose which is deemed to confer some benefit on society. Any profit that may be
generated is not distributed to, or for the benefit of, any member of the organization. Section
501(c) covers not only "charitable organizations." § 501(c)(3). It also covers "corporations,
and any community chest, fund, or foundation organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literacy or educational purposes, or to
foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals.. ." as well as social clubs, labor unions, veterans' organizations, trade
associations, chambers of commerce, burial societies and cooperatives of various sorts-all of
which promote social welfare or mutual benefit purposes. 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4)-(21) (1997).
3 The most widely publicized scandals in recent years are the United Way debacle and
the New Era scam. The institutional integrity of United Way of America was called into
question when William Aramony, former president of the organization, was convicted of purloining a substantial sum from the charity's assets and diverting it to the satisfaction of his
taste for luxury. See Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of More
than $600,000, N.Y. TmsS, Apr. 14, 1997, at Al. The New Era scandal involved a Ponzi
scheme in which the founder of the Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, John G. Bennett,
Jr., enticed investors to contribute more than $354 million to his foundation on the strength of
his assurance that their return on the investment would double within six months because of
the contributions of anonymous benefactors. The Foundation is bankrupt; the SEC has
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targets a spate of both federal and state legislative proposals, which are
designed to change the way nonprofit organizations operate or are regulated. These legislative proposals are fueled-in part-by recent allegations by the roiling economic and political atmosphere in which the
nonprofit sector operates. 4 Not surprisingly, this turn of events has in-

spired a debate over the role of the nonprofit sector in our society. Commentators take it as an elementary proposition that the efficacy of
legislative initiatives to change the playing field for the nonprofit sector
should be measured against the roles these nonprofits have been assigned
to play. 5 However, recent scholarly work in the field has viewed those
roles almost exclusively through the prism of neoclassical economic theory, which it has applied to the various tax benefits accorded qualifying
6

nonprofit organizations.
While this scholarship has added significantly to our understanding
of nonprofit activity in the United States, any understanding of the roles
that nonprofit organizations play in American society would be incomplete if it relied solely on an economic theoretical framework. Political
theory also contributes significantly in developing a deeper understanding. In this article, I suggest a way of thinking about the roles of nonprofits that employs the perspective of Western political theory. This
article concludes that the nonprofit sector makes a significant, probably
pivotal, contribution to the American form of representative democracy
in at least three respects. First, the nonprofit sector teaches the skills of
self-government. Second, it inculcates the habits of tolerance and civility. Finally, it mediates the space between the individual and the other
two sectors of society, that is, the "public" or governmental sector and
the "private" or "entrepreneurial" or "proprietary" sector. Thus, the nonprofit sector acts as a counterpoise against excessive displays of power
emanating from the public or private sectors. Consequently, any legislative attempt to change the way the nonprofit sector is regulated should
preserve its capacity to play these three political roles effectively.
Part I of this article describes the universe of nonprofits and recapitulates their status in today's society. I begin with a description and hisclaimed that the scheme violated federal securities laws. See Benjamin Welser, 4 at Syracuse
FinanceFirm Indicted in Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at C2; Joseph Slobodzihn, New Era Founder Says God Made Him Do It, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 17, 1997, at A9 (Mr.
Bennett has asserted that he was on a "mission from God.").
4 The policy of downsizing the federal government has placed the nonprofit sector in a
double-bind: it faces increased demands for the services it provides in order to take up the
slack created by discontinued federal programs; simultaneously, it must compete for a shrinking federal grant dollar. Additionally, some industries in the nonprofit sector face special
challenges pertinent to their discrete industries. In that regard, the ongoing evolution in the
health care industry comes to mind.
5 See discussion infra Part Il.B.
6 See discussion infra Part I.B. 1.2.
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torical overview of the development of the sector in American society.
Then, Part I delineates the tax benefits available to nonprofit organizations under the current legal regime. Part II discusses the problem of
defining the legislative intent of the legal regime for nonprofits. It identifies the economic theories currently deployed to explain and to critique
the current regime. Part II begins with an explanation of the three-part
role of nonprofits from the perspective of American political theory. It
then broadens the perspective and tracks the evolution of the concept of
civil society in the Western political tradition. Part IV contrasts the
Western political heritage with the experience of Central Europe. By
way of illustration, the analysis narrows its focus to Slovakia. Recent
legislation relative to nonprofits in Slovakia so clearly exemplifies hostility toward nonprofits that it serves as a benchmark, an exemplar, of legislation intended to weaken the ability of the nonprofit sector in playing an
active role in the development of this "emerging democracy." In this
context, Part IV engages the critique of postmodern social scientists,
harbingers of the end of the civil society in which the sector operates.
The article concludes by suggesting that while a healthy skepticism is
useful, postmodernist projections are premature at best.
I.

THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND AMERICAN LAW:
AN OVERVIEW

A. HISTORICAL FRAMEwoRK
1. Description of the Sector
"Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations ... religious, moral, serious, futile, general or
restricted, enormous or diminutive... if it is proposed to inculcate some
truth or to foster some feeling by-the encouragement of a great example,
they form a society."'7 Tocqueville's picturesque description of this heterogeneous and continuously expanding sector s is as accurate today as it
was in 1831 when he and his friend, Gustave de Beaumont, toured
America "with the intention of examining, in detail as scientifically as
possible, all the mechanism (ressorts) of ...

American society . ... "9

Beyond Tocqueville's expansive portrait of the sector, it can be said
that the sector's diverse membership shares some characteristics in common. First, while nonprofits may, and occasionally do, make a profit, if
7 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 513.

8 See Evelyn Brody, InternationalDissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 ViLL. L. REv.
433, 466 n.159, 471 n.185 ("the number of tax-exempt charities has grown 5% a year for the
last eight years.") (citing VRGuIuA A. HODGKINSON Er AL., NoNPRoFrr ALMANAC: 1996-97:
DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECrOR 37 tbl.1.1, 219 (1996)).
9 GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE AND BEAUMONT IN AMERICA 32 (John Hop-

kins Univ. Press 1996) (1938).
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they intend to qualify for tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue
Code (hereinafter Code or I.R.S.), that profit cannot inure to the personal
benefit of any of their members. This "nondistribution constraint' is
the sine qua non of nonprofits which qualify for tax-exempt status under
the Code. 1 ' Second, the sector encompasses all voluntary associations
that comprise what is generally called "civil society." The sector should
be distinguished from governmental bodies (the public sector) on the one
hand and proprietary organizations (the private sector) on the other. Furthermore, there are no, nor have there ever been, hermetic boundaries
delimiting the activities of one sector from those of the other two.
Rather, the history of the relationship between the three sectors is characterized by interaction and interdependence. 12 Finally, nonprofit organizations' purposes are various and diverse. Moreover, the kinds of
purposes for which nonprofits form are typically divided into two general
categories: "public benefit organizations" and "mutual benefit
associations."

Public benefit organizations are those organizations that are said to
confer a direct benefit on society in the form of charitable, religious,
scientific or educational services.' 3 "Mutual benefit" societies, as the
name implies, are formed for the express purpose of advancing some
interest, cause or goal shared by their discrete membership and not by the
10 See Henry Hanson, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)
(coining the phrase "nondistribution constraint").
11 See text accompanying note 2.
12 See Brody, supra note 8, at 468-76. Her analysis is profoundly pertinent to the protracted effort of some politicians and advocacy groups to defenestrate the current alliance
between government and the nonprofit sector by significantly altering the tax-exemption and
grant programs available to nonprofits. Historical record does not bear out the contention of
these groups that a bifurcation of government and nonprofit efforts in the troublesome area of
social services would return the country to a prior age of purely private philanthropy. See
Vince Stehle, Righting Philanthropy, NATION, June 30, 1997, at 15. Stehle quotes Lester
Salamon's forthcoming book, Holding in Center: America's Nonprofit Sector at a Crossroads,
for the proposition that "'Despite a widespread belief in a mythical "golden age" of purely
voluntary involvement and wholly private philanthropic support, a rich, and largely productive, collaboration has existed between nonprofit organizations and government from the very
beginning of this nation."' Id. (quoting Lester Salamon, HOLDING IN CENTER: AMERICA's
NONPROFrr SECTOR AT A CROSSROADS (forthcoming)). Stehle goes on to assert that "by 1870
a survey of social service agencies operating in New York found that only 11 percent were
entirely supported by private charity, while 60 percent received over half of their income from
government sources." Id. The "subsidy" or income tax exemption for qualified nonprofits
dates back to the colonial period. For example, Harvard was established under public charter
with a government grant. See John D. Colombo, Why is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other
Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private EducationalInstitutions), 35 ARiz. L. REv. 841, 845
(1993).
The term "civil society" may connote different configurations of the non-governmental
sectors. Some commentators include the private entrepreneurial sector in "civil society."
Others, including this author, divide society into three sectors: public (government); private
(free market economy); and nonprofit ("civil society").
13 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., THE CHARITABLE NONPROFIT 96 (1994).
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public generally. 14 Thus, whatever benefit these societies confer on the
public as a whole must be-by definition-indirect. This basic distinction between the two kinds of association that comprise the nonprofit
sector parallels the most basic division of the benefits conferred upon
nonprofits by the Code. 15 While the Code constitutes the modem framework for conferring tax benefits on nonprofits, the practice of according
certain nonprofit associations governmental benefits pre-dates the
Code.' 6 Indeed, it was initiated before nationhood in colonial America.
2. Evolution of the Nonprofit Sector and Development of
Nonprofit Law in America
"Charity" is, of course, the core activity we recognize as "nonprofit." The colonists brought with them the English tradition of conferring special status and benefits on associations dedicated to "charitable"
causes. 17 Whatever their differences, the colonists shared the Protestant
creed of individual service to the community. 18 That Protestant commitment to "charity" or "good works" was enhanced by the fact that the
colonial period coincided with an era of philanthropic fervor in Europe.' 9
It also co-existed with the practical realities of establishing schools, hospitals and churches in the colonies. 20 Thus, colonial America was hospitable to charitable associations from its inception for several reasons and
its hospitality was expressed through a variety of public and private part21
nerships and tax benefits.
Following the Revolution, charitable associations followed the trend
established by proprietary associations and organized, first, under the
various state charter regimes, and then, under the evolving state corpo14

See

JAMES

J. FIsmAN

& STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

69 (1995)

15 See text accompanying note 2.
16 See Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in IV RESEARCH PAPERs SPONSORED BY THE FILER
COMUMSSION ON PRIVATE PILANTHROPY AND Punc
NEEDS 2025 (1977); Mark A. Hall &
John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory
of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307 (1991).
17 The term "charitable" is historically a fluid one. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43
Eliz. ch. 4, (1601) (Eng) includes, among other activities, "relief of aged, impotent and poor
people... maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers ... schools of learning... repair of
bridges ... churches and houses of correction" under its auspices. Id. For an interesting
account of the evolution of Charitable Trust Law in England see Lars G. Gustafsson, The
Definition of 'Charitable' for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Defrocking the Old and Suggesting some New FundamentalAssumptions, 33 Hous" L. REv. 587, 591 (1996).
18 See HOWARD S. MILLER, Ti LEGAL FOuNDATIONs OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY
1776-1844 (1961).
19 See ROBERT A. BRE1ER, AMERICAN PH

L T-IROPY 5-8 (2d ed. 1988).

See MILLER, supra note 18, at xi.
See FISHm AN & SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 825-46 (for a more complete discussion
of the charities-in colonial America).
20
21
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rate governance laws. 22 Thus, the nonprofit sector in this country devel-

oped under corporate law, as distinguished from the sector's progenitor
in England which developed under trust law.23 The states continued the
colonial practice of conferring property tax exemptions on the core charitable organizations: churches, hospitals and schools. 24
The federal government initially enacted a statute exempting charitable associations from taxation in 1894 when it passed the first corporate income tax law.25 The law expressly exempted organizations and
trusts formed and operated "for charitable, religious or educational purposes."' 2 6 Since that date, the tax law relative to the nonprofit sector has
been expanded (as to class 27 and as to circumstances 28 ) and refined (to

distinguish among various kinds of groups qualifying for special tax
treatment2 9).
B.

THE MODERN FRAMEWORK FOR

TAx

TREATMENT OF NONPROFITS

AND THE CONUNDRUM OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT

1. The Federal Scheme
Federal tax treatment of the nonprofit sector is best understood as
dividing the sector into four distinct groups and tailoring tax benefits to
address the distinct attributes of each group. 30 While all nonprofit organizations must honor the "nondistribution constraint" in order to qualify
for the § 501 income tax exemption, a basic distinction is drawn in § 501
between public benefit organizations ("the charitables"), described in
§ 501(c)(3), and the mutual benefit organizations, described in
§§ 501(c)(4)-(21).
Organizations that qualify for § 501(c)(3) treatment must serve
"religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes."' 3' In addition to the "nondistribution constraint,"
22 See id. at 34-38, 64; MILLER, supra note 18, at 15.
23 See Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 14, at 34-38.
24 See id. at 308.
25 See id. at 34-38.
26 Revenue Act of 1894, ch 349, §32, 28 Stat. 556 (repealed 1895); see infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (added to extend the tax-exemption to mutual benefit
associations).

28 In 1917 the Code was amended to grant a tax deduction to charitable gifts. 26 U.S.C.
§501(c). The unlimited deduction for charitable bequests was added to the Code in 1918. See
id.
29 Only donors to the "charitables" are entitled to the tax deduction. Id. The charitable
organizations were subsequently subdivided under the Code and treated differently. See id.;
text accompanying note 2.
30 See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations:A Review of Federal and State Policies, in Tim NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 68-73 (Walter
W. Powell ed., 1987).
31 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3).
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these organizations are further proscribed from deploying a "substantial
part"of their efforts to influence legislation (lobbying).32 Campaigning
for any candidate for public office is entirely prohibited. 33 However, organizations entitled to § 501(c)(3) status enjoy not only the income tax
exemption, shared by all § 501(c) organizations but several additional
tax benefits. Donors to § 501(c)(3) organizations generally receive tax
deductions for inter vivos gifts and bequests or legacies. 34 They may
issue tax-exempt bonds to raise money for certain projects. 35 They are
entitled to reduced postal rates 36 and are exempt from federal unemploy37
ment taxes.
Mutual benefit associations, including social clubs, consumer coops, labor unions, business clubs, cemetery associations and veterans organizations are entitled to some, but not all, of the benefits conferred on
public benefit associations. They are tax exempt but their donors do not
enjoy a tax deduction for contributions; they may not issue tax-exempt
38
bonds and they are not eligible for the unemployment tax exemption.
However, they do not suffer the same constraints on political activity as
39
do § 501(c)(3) organizations.
The second major division of nonprofits under the Code occurs
within the § 501(c)(3) category: private foundations are distinguished
from operating charities and are burdened with additional strictures on
their behavior. 40 Finally, the sub-category of private foundations is divided into two groups: grant-making foundations and operating foundations. Grant-making foundations are subject to more restrictions than
41
their operating counterparts.
2. State Taxation of Nonprofit Organizations
Nonprofits that qualify for § 501(c)(3) status and often nonprofits
that qualify for exempt status under other provisions of § 501 are entitled
to exemptions from corporate and franchise taxes under various state
32 Id.
33 See id.

34 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 2055, 2522.
35 See 26 U.S.C. § 145.
36 See 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (1990).
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8); BAZIL FACCHINA Er AL., PRVILEGES AND ExEmTONS
ENJOYED BY NONPROFTr ORGANIZATIONS: A CATALOG AND SOME THOUGHTS ON NoNPRoFrr

POLICYMAING 37-40 (1993).
38 See FIsImAN & ScHw. z,supra note 14, at 682.

39 See id. at 547-50, 682-724.
40 See id. at 310-11.
41 See id; see, e.g., FRAN S R. HiLL & BARBARA L. KmscHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE
TAXATION OF ExEmw ORGANIZATIONS (1994).
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laws. 4 2 They are also generaily exempt from property taxes and from
43
sales taxes at the state and local levels.
3.

Summary and Interrogatory

As a general proposition, then, we can say that nonprofit organizations are entitled to an array of tax benefits, or "breaks," as long as they
engage in their avowed not-for-profit purpose and eschew, or limit, political activities. It is important to see this legal landscape ("lawscape") of
the nonprofit territory as a backdrop for the current debate about nonprofits. The confluence of economic and social pressure placed on the
sector as a result of the government-downsizing agenda, and of political
pressure in the form of legislative proposals to change the legal framework within which the sector operates, gives rise to an inevitable and
narrow question: What was the purpose (the legislative intent) of the
existing legal framework?-and to a broader, but more fundamental,
question: what roles do (and should) nonprofits play in American
society?
II.

A.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT: HERMENEUTIC ATTEMPTS TO
RATIONALIZE THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF
THE SECTOR
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Because the federal income tax exemption is the keystone of federal
and state tax frameworks covering nonprofits, an understanding of the
legislative purposes for which the exception it was enacted is of fundamental importance. However, from its inception in 1894,44 the federal
statute which exempts qualified nonprofits from income tax obligations
has suffered from a paucity of legislative pronouncements concerning its
purpose. While it is universally agreed 45 that the concept and special tax
treatment of charities devolves from English law relative to charitable
trusts (dating from the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses in
1601),46 it was not until 1938 that a statement of the purpose of the exemption could be found in United States legislative history. 47 Congress
asserted that the exemption was premised on the theory that government
would be reimbursed for the loss of revenues occasioned by the exempSee generally FACCHINA ET AL., supra note 37, at 26.
43 See id. at 30.
44 See Act of 1894, ch. 349, §32, 28 Stat. 556 (repealed 1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (current version at ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913))
(declaring the Act of 1894 unconstitutional).
45 See, e.g., BRUCE R. HoPKmIs, THE LAW OF TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 70 (6th ed.
42

1992).
46 See FIsHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at 28.

47 See id. at 336-39.
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tion, in the form of services that promote the general welfare, and for
48
which the government would otherwise be obliged to provide.
In the absence of a more definitive statement of the legislative purposes underlying the tax exemption, the courts have pieced together a
loosely constructed analysis. 4 9 Core to judicial interpretations, however,
are the dual concepts suggested in the House Report: that the charitable
exemptions are justified by the benefit the public enjoys from the work
of the exempt organizations and by the fact that any tax dollars foregone
by the government are recompensed by the services provided ....

serv-

ices the government would be constrained to undertake.5 0
Representative of the inferences drawn by the courts in attempting
to divine the intent of the legislature relative to the tax exemption are the
following cases. In a 1924 case, Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,5 ' the court drew the following inference: "Evidently the exemption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives
from corporate activities of the class named and is intended to aid them
when not conducted for private gain.' '52 That case involved a challenge
to the tax-exempt status of a corporation operated for eleemosynary purposes. 53 In a 1970 case, Walz v. Tax Commission,54 the Court considered
the issue of whether a religious organization qualified for exemption
from state property tax and found that it did. 55 Concurring in the result
and citing the 1938 House Report, 56 Justice Brennan opined that "private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the community... and thereby bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be
met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community. ' 57 Finally, in a 1983 case, Bob Jones v. United States,58 the
48

H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. (1938).

49 See Gustafsson, supra note 17, at 609-17 (reviewing court decisions construing the

terms "charity" and "charitable purposes").
50 H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. (1938).
51 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
52 See id. at 581.
53 See id.; FisHmAN & ScHwAPz, supra note 14, at 358-65.

54 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
55 See id. at 665-67.
56 H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. (1938); 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57 It is worth noting that Justice Brennan also suggested a much broader rationale for
supporting the nonprofit sector. He stated that nonprofits "contribute to the diversity of association, viewpoint and enterprise essential to a vigorous pluralistic society .... " 397 U.S. at
687. Tax-exemptions, he noted, "merely facilitate the existence of a broad range of private,
nonprofit organizations .
I..."
Id. at 689. In Walz, Justice Harlan also reached beyond the
narrow question of legislative intent to the broader issue of the role nonprofits play when he
said that nonprofits engage in "activities devoted to cultural and moral improvement and the
doing of 'good works' by performing certain social services in the community that might
otherwise have to be assumed by government [activities which serve to further] moral and
intellectual diversity .... " Id. at 696-97.
58 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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Court found that nonprofit schools that enforce racially discriminatory
admissions policies are not entitled to tax benefits. 59 In so ruling, the
Court declared that the legislative intent of the federal tax exemption
laws was to foster those nonprofit organizations "that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the
'60
same kind."
This, then, is the broad and amorphous judicial construction given
the tax law benefitting nonprofits. Identified in scholarly parlance as a
kind of "subsidy theory," a "government failure theory" or a "quid pro
quo theory," it relies on the 1938 House report which suggests a "quid
pro quo:" a tax benefit is conferred upon nonprofits that contribute to the
public interest or welfare by providing services that, otherwise, the government would be required to perform. 6 1 It offers no express standard
for what activity qualifies as public interest welfare. 62 Thus, judicial interpretation of the legislative intent behind the tax-exemption for the
nonprofit sector remains as general and vague as the intent it attempts to
divine.
B.

THEORIES ABOUT THE ROLES OF NONPROFITS

The larger question of what roles the sector plays in society may
inform the more narrow question of legislative intent relative to the taxexemption statutes. An adequate evaluation of that larger issue implicates both Western political theory and Western economic theory. Perhaps the most comprehensive statement regarding the various roles the
sector plays in American society is to be found in Lester M. Salamon's
63
America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer.
There, Salamon identifies five basic reasons for the existence of the
sector: "historical," "market failure," "government failure," "pluralism/
freedom" and "solidarity."'64 Historically, Salamon says that voluntary
organizations performed important societal functions in pre-Revolutionary America. 65 Thus, such organizations were firmly entrenched even
prior to the establishment of state and federal governments. 66 The nonprofit sector had the imprimatur of a pre-existing society. 67 Further,
59 See id. at 575.
60 Id. at 588.

61 See infra notes 84-99 and accompanying text.

62 But see 461 U.S. at 616 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting that Congress described
both the class and the circumstances covered by the exemption when it identified the eight
categories of nonprofits entitled to the exemption).
SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER (1992).
64 Id. at 7-10; see also Gustafsson, supra note 17, at 591 and accompanying text.
65 See SALAMON, supra note 63, at 7.
63 LESTER M.

66 See id.
67 See id.
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Salamon explains that the "market failure" rationale for the sector has
two distinct aspects: the "free-rider" problem and the "contract-failure"
68
problem.
Both the "free-rider" and "contract-failure" problems result from
"certain inherent limitations in the market system. '69 The "free-rider"
situation occurs in the common arenas of the economy (the air, parks,
and so forth), where an improvement made to a particular arena can be
enjoyed by all, irrespective of payment or contribution. 70 No cost is imposed on the "free rider." Hence, the profit motive that fuels the private
71
sector will not inspire it to provide these common or public goods.
The "contract failure" problems occurs when there is no market
check or monitoring device on the quality of the goods or services provided.72 Here, the recipients of the services do not pay for the goods or
services, and therefore, have no pocketbook leverage against poor quality.73 Since the free market private sector provides no mechanism for
correcting this problem, consumers find the nonprofit sector a more trust74
worthy source of these kinds of goods and services.
Salamon explains that not only the private sector but also the public
sector has certain "inherent limitations. '75 "Government failure" describes the cumbersome nature of government and its consequent inability to respond quickly to changed circumstances, to experiment, to serve
isolated or discrete interests that lack public support.76 The nonprofit
sector is capable of compensating for government limitations in these
respects. 77 Quoting John Stuart Mill for the proposition that while the
public sector promotes uniformity, the nonprofit sector nourishes diversity, Salamon adds that "[m]ost of the major reforms in American Society ... have originated in this nonprofit sector. ' 78 Thus, the nonprofit
sector gives voice and succor to the individual and to minority groups,
thereby serving the interests of "pluralism and freedom." Finally, quoting Tocqueville, Salamon concludes that the nonprofit sector promotes
solidarity among individuals, and thereby empowers them to influence
activities in the public sector. 79 Salamon's analysis sketches the con68

Id.

69
70

Id. at 7-8.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 8.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
See id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11. Salamon quotes Tocqueville for the proposition that "'among democratic
... all citizens are independent and feeble.... They all, therefore, become powerless

71
72
73

74
75
76

77
78
79

nations
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tours of the nonprofit sector and provides a more descriptive analysis of
its various roles in American society, rendering a more precise definition
to the terms "public purpose," "public interest" or "public welfare"terms that courts have regularly employed to explain the legislative intent of-or public policy reasons for-the preferential treatment ac80
corded nonprofits under U.S. tax law.

Recent legal scholarship has given more focussed attention to the
81
second rationale for nonprofits identified by Salamon: market failure.
It has sought numerous ways to explain, to justify or to criticize the current legal regime from the vantage point of economic theory. Beginning
with the publication of Boris Bittker and George Rahdert's defining article,82 the literature in this area has developed what has justifiably been
'83
called an "emerging orthodoxy.
Bittker and Rahdert's article argues that tax exemption for nonprofits was to be explained by the amorphous nature of nonprofit income and
expenditure and the consequent difficulties in ascertaining the appropriate tax rate for a nonprofit. 84 In developing their argument, they especially considered the income of nonprofits derived from donations
(arguably exempt gifts under § 102 of the I.R.C.). 85 They characterized
nonprofit expenditures as outlays of monies and services to charitable
beneficiaries (arguably taxable as trust income at the income tax rates of
86
a disparate group of beneficiaries).
But, as Henry Hansmann noted, the Bittker and Rahdert thesis failed
to encompass the entire universe of nonprofits. 87 He argued that their
thesis omitted nonprofits that derive a substantial portion of their income
not from donations but from goods and services they provide. 88 Income
to these nonprofits is indistinguishable from income derived from propriif they do not learn voluntarily to help one another."' Id. He also highlights Tocqueville's
vivid contrast between American voluntarism and French problem-solving: "'wherever at the
head of some new undertaking you see government in France... in the United States you will
be sure to find an association."' Id.; TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 513 ("In every case, at the

head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England
some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association.").

80 See SALAMON, supra note 63, at 13-32.
81 Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). For an earlier research paper on the role

the nonprofit sector plays in the economy see Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-SectorEconomy, reprintedin THE NONPROFrr ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS

(David L. Giles et al. eds., 1990).

82 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 81, at 299.
83 See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 501, 512

(1990).
84 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 81, at 307.
85 See id. at 307-14.
86 See id. at 308.
87 Hanson, supra note 10, at 835.
88 See id. at 881.
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etary enterprises in the private sector. 89 Hansmann's thesis, developed in
two articles published in the early 1980s, became the second major contribution to an evolving economic theory deployed to critique the taxexemption for nonprofits. 90
In Salamon's synopsis the nonprofit sector compensates for inadequacies in the two other sectors: the inability of democratic government
to make timely response to new or marginalized public welfare issues
and the inability of the profit-motivated sector to supply unprofitable
public welfare goods. 9 1 Hansmann's now orthodox view focuses primarily on the market failure prong of these "twin failures. '9 2 In coming to
this conclusion, Hansmann first observed the defining characteristic of
all nonprofits: the "nondistribution constraint": that any profit derived
from nonprofit activity may not inure to the benefit of any member of the
organization.93 Hansmann then identified four major types of nonprofits
on the basis of how they are financed (donation verses commercial) and
94
how they are controlled (by donors or "patrons" verses by the market).
He described how these four types compensate for the "market failure"
or "contract failure" of the private sector in several respects. 95
The first contract failure occurs in those situations where the donor
and the recipient of the services or goods are separated. 96 In the private
sector, the donor has no assurance that the recipient actually benefits
from the donation. However, in the nonprofit sector, the "nondistribution constraint" increases the likelihood that the donation benefits the
intended recipient rather than the membership of the nonprofit. 97 Hence
the nonprofit sector is the preferred vehicle for delivering goods and
services in this arena.98 A second, related problem arises when the mix
of goods and services is so inherently complex and interrelated that,
though the purchaser/donor and the consumer/recipient are identical, the
leverage of private sector mechanisms to sanction the quality of goods or
services provided fails. 99 Again, the "nondistribution constraint" imposed on the nonprofit sector diminishes the likelihood that quality will
89 See id

90 See id at 893; Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 58 (1981); Colombo, supra note 12,
at 858; but see PETER L. SwoRDs, CHARrrABLE PROPERTY TA ExamnrloNs iN NEw YoRK
STATE

95 (1981).

SALAMON, supra note 63, at 34-52 and accompanying text.
See Hansmann, supra note 90, at 53-8.
93 Id
94 Id at 59.
95 See id
96 See id at 60.
97 Id.at 73.
98 See id.at 61.
99 See idU
at 68.
91

92
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suffer in the face of a profit motive to shortchange the customer/recipient. 10 0

Another contract failure occurs in the "free-rider" context.

Where the public good provided can be enjoyed without recompense
from those who benefit from it, the for-profit sector has little incentive to
provide the good. Conversely, the inability to maximize profits is not a
disincentive for nonprofits, given their nondistribution constraint.101
The tax exemption compensates the nonprofit sector for the nondistribution and other constraints under which it operates.' 02 For example,
10 3
nonprofits lack access to equity markets and to debt financing.
Hansmann concludes that the tax exemption should be available only to
those nonprofits who suffer these constraints and compensate for the
market failure of the private sector. 1°4 Hansmann's thesis provides an
analytical framework of much greater sophistication and depth than the
"quidpro quo" theory or "governmental failure" theory often employed
by the courts in their efforts to explain tax-exemption. 10 5 It also has
more universal application than Bittker and Rahdert's Income Measurement theory because it includes nonprofits whose income base goes beyond donations and includes commercial activity.
Hansmann's thesis was expanded and refined by Mark Hall and
John Colombo. 10 6 Hall and Colombo added to the scholarship by asserting that the distinguishing attribute of nonprofits is their ability to attract
voluntary donations; hence, the tax deduction should be available only to
those nonprofits which garner significant donative support. 10 7 This theory is more comprehensive than Hansmann's in that it includes property
tax exemptions as well as income tax exemptions. 10 8
The donative theory is tangentially related to another theory which
contributed to and went beyond the orthodox rationale premised upon
economic theory. Rob Atkinson's thesis is that, with the exception of
"mutual commercial nonprofits" (like parent-run daycare centers), all
100 Id. at 72.
101 See id. at 68-81; see also Colombo, supra note 12, at 515-19.
102 See Hansmann, supra note 90, at 72.
103 See id. at 73.
104 Id. at 75.
105 See, e.g., supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
106 Hall & Colombo, supra note 16, at 307.
107 See Colombo, supra note 12, at 867; Evelyn Brody, Agents without Principals:The
Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. Rev. 457 (1996) (arguing the exemption should be available only for charitable behavior rather than to a nonprofit organizational form); see also M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy
Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the CharitableExemption, 80 MnNq. L. REv. 299, 404

(1995) (arguing the exemption should be phased out); Nina J. Crimm, Evolutionary Forces:
Changes in For-Profitand Not-For-ProfitHealth Care Delivery Structures; A Regeneration

of Tax Exemption Standards,37 B.C. L. REv. 1, 31 (1995) (arguing the tax-exemption should
be extended to for-profits and nonprofits that engage in charitable activities).
108 See Colombo, supra note 12, at 869-76.
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nonprofits (including Hansmann's commercially-financed nonprofits as
well as the donor-financed enterprises) are motivated by some form of
altruism in that they forgo profits for their membership ("nondistribution
constraint") in order to pursue a higher, "altruistic" purpose. 10 9 This behavior is, and should be, rewarded by society in the form of taxexemptions. 110
Atkinson's thesis has not emerged from the scholarly debate unscathed. As has been true of each of the theories developed within the
economic orthodoxy, the shortcomings of this thesis have been documented. For example, Colombo observes that while Atkinson's theory
has the advantage of "administrability," he questions whether the decision to elect the nonprofit form is indeed altruistically motivated and
whether altruism itself is a sufficient justification for a tax-exemption. 111
Conversely, Atkinson has critiqued economic orthodoxy as a whole, and
he found it wanting in certain important respects." 2 Significantly, he
observes that by limiting the analysis to economic rationales, like market
failure, orthodox scholars artificially exclude other extra-economic or
"meta benefits" of the nonprofit sector. 113
This artificial exclusion, Colombo argues, inadvertently but ineluctably gives succor to those who seek to constrain the reach of the nonprofit sector. 114 For example, advocates of the private sector, fearing
competition from the nonprofit sector where their markets overlap, currently seek legislative protection from nonprofit activity. 115 They can
find support from a theory that describes nonprofit activity as most appropriately occurring only where the market (private sector) fails. 116 Indeed, that is the pre-eminent canon of the Hansmann thesis. Atkinson,
therefore, seeks to broaden the analysis beyond economic justification to
109 Atkinson, supra note 83, at 553.

110 See id. at 628-35.
111 Colombo, supra note 12, at 871-73.

112 While the major contributors to the economic orthodoxy are currently the Income
Measures Theory, see Bittker & Rahder, supra note 81; the Capital Subsidy Theory, see
Hansmann, supra note 90; and the Donative Theory, see Hall & Colombo, supra note 16, all of
which expand upon the quid pro quo theory enunciated by the courts, some scholarly work
goes beyond economic analysis and introduces different criteria for evaluating the tax-exempt
status of nonprofits.
113 Atkinson, supra note 83, at 503-12. He states for example, that "Etihe emerging orthodox account... describes nonprofits as a response to social and economics challenges beyond
the capabilities of for-profit firms on the one hand and government on the other... It is,
however, an incomplete account. Moreover, its omissions limit its utility as a tool for policy
makers and make it a potentially dangerous instrument in the hands of those who would cut
back government policies favoring nonprofits." Id. at 503.
114 Colombo, supra note 12, at 877.
115 Id. at 850.
i16 See id. at 864.
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describe another account of the justification for tax-exemption: the altru117
istic motivation of nonprofit activity.
Atkinson's thesis opens the door to a more comprehensive rationale
for the tax-exemption. Another rationale that reaches beyond economic
analysis is the Community Benefit Theory.11 Recently, that theory has
been developed and applied in the strand of the scholarship that evaluates
the efficacy of the tax-exemption in the health care industry. 119 Illustrative of this theory is an article entitled Charity and Community: The
Role of Nonprofit Ownership in a Managed Health Care System, 120 in
which the authors identify five discrete types of community benefit to be
found in the nonprofit health care industry: (1) It extends benefits to
those not covered by health care plan,; (2) it disseminates health care
information (a benefit that addresses the public good-market failure
problem); (3) it reduces the problem of information asymmetries by making it less likely that a doctor's role as patient advocate would be compromised by the profit motive to use less expensive treatments in
clinically "gray areas"; (4) it limits the cost shift to care providers; and
(5) it encourages "community representation in the governance of managed care plans." 12 1 Economically-inclined scholars have been quick to
disparage the Community Benefit Theory as unworkable because its
standards are unquantifiable. 12 2 As a limiting standard for applying the
tax exemption status it is as amorphous as the quid pro quo standard
under which the courts and the Service labor today. 12 3 And like the quid
pro quo standard, it fails to make a causal connection between the exemption and the nonprofit activity. 124
The economic scholar's view, however, that to be viable an exemption theory must be quantifiable, proves too much 125 and begs the larger
117 See id. at 873.
118 Mark Schlesinger et al., Charity and Community: The Role of Nonprofit Ownership in
a Managed Health Care System, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 697, 700 (1996).
119 See Colombo, supra note 12, at 864.
120 Schlesinger et al., supra note 118, at 700.
121 Id. at 700-01.
122 See id.

123 See Colombo, supra note 12, at 865-68.
124 See id. Colombo argues, by way of example, "If consumers prefer the special ethic in
education provided by Harvard, why would they not continue to prefer Harvard even absent
the exemption? Would Harvard really go out of business if it were not tax exempt? True,
absent the exemption a Harvard education might cost more than it does now ... [i]f this is a
legitimate government concern, however, it can be addressed more directly ... by ... direct
government grants or other financial aid." Id. at 867.
125 While certainty is a consummation devoutly to be wished, it is not always availing.
Development of an argument that legislatures, courts and agencies routinely apply standards
that are not quantifiable is beyond the scope of this article. Atkinson observes "orthodox
theory holds that, under the particular failures of the market economy that tend to give rise to

nonprofit organizations, those organizations perform more efficiently than alternative forprofit suppliers. Unfortunately, however, their very nonprofit nature bars their access to equity
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question: what roles do nonprofits play, not only in the economy, but in
society at large? Surely, any attempt to evaluate the current tax-exemption regimes, or the inundation of recent legislative proposals designed to
alter current law, should not be constrained by the parameters of economic analysis. Western political theory clearly has a great deal to add
to the discussion. That issue is suggested by, but not synonymous with,
factors four and five in Salamon's Primer126 and by the more amorphous
Community Benefit Theory. If we can identify important roles the nonprofit sector plays in sustaining our form of representative democracy,
then certainly the merit of any legislative proposal or scheme to regulate
nonprofits must be measured against the likelihood that it will impede
the sector's performance of these vital roles.
III.

THE ROLES NONPROFITS PLAY IN THE AMERICAN
VERSION OF A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

A.

ToIm-RTicAL UNDERPhNrINGS

1. Reciprocal Tolerance and the American "Civil Society"
The notion that the division of power is an important vehicle for
securing and maintaining democratic stability is older than the nation
itself. Its most succinct and famous expression in American political
philosophy can be found in Madison's advice that sovereignty be divided, first, between the federal government and the various states and,
then, among the three branches of the federal government.' 27 But it is in
his concept of "ordered liberty" identified in The Federalist51 that
Madison describes as the bulwark against the tyranny of one group of
citizens over another:
capital markets.... This inherent impediment is relieved... rather crudely, by exempting
their net revenues from federal income taxation." Atkinson, supranote 83, at 508. The orthodox notion that the exemption should be available in the market failure context because it
quantifiably enhances efficiencies in that venue could be used to expand the sector into markets they share with for-profits. There is evidence that nonprofit hospitals are more efficient in
the health care industry than their for-profit brethren because their administrative costs are
appreciably lower. See Robert Pear, In Separate Studies, Costs of Hospitals Are Debated,
N.Y. Tmms, Mar. 13, 1997, at C2 ("Investor-owned hospitals have significantly higher administrative costs than nonprofit hospitals ....
[A] separate study [indicates] that hospitals of all
types had radically reduced the growth of their total costs. Taken together, the studies suggest
that hospital costs have leveled off, but that administrative costs account for a growing share of
the total."). The first study, published in New England Journalof Medicine found that "forprofit hospitals spend 23 per cent more on administration than do comparable private not-forprofit hospitals and 34 per cent more than public institutions." Brody, supra note 107, at 467
(observing that nonprofits operate more efficiently and for-profits less efficiently than generally believed).
126 SALAmoN, supra note 63, at 7-10.
127 THm FEDERALIsT Nos. 10, 46-50 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard
the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to
guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
There are but two methods of providing against this evil:
The one by creating a will in the community, independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other
by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole, very improbable, if not
impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority.... The second method will be exemplified in the
federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts,
interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little dangerfrom
12 8
interested combinations of the majority."
This Madisonian precept finds expression not only in the way political power is apportioned in the American public sector, but also in the
matrix of diverse, overlapping and interactive nonprofit associations that
embody American "civil society,"' 29 or the nonprofit sector. As Michael
Walzer states in his insightful study On Toleration,130 so vital is this
matrix to American society that it constitutes an important part of our
common identity, our "civil religion,"' 131 which "facilitates the toleration
of partial differences-or it encourages us to think of difference as only
partial."'132 The focus of Professor Walzer's study was toleration, con128 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (emphasis added).

129 The concept of a "civil society" is much maligned in contemporary postmodern circles. Commentary has degenerated from a "healthy skepticism" to a "new form of dogma,"
which declares untenable "the possibility that human beings have anything in common, and
[aims] to silence efforts to explore this domain." Barbara Ehrenreich & Janet McIntosh, The
New Creationism:Biology UnderAttack, NATION, June 9, 1997, at 13 (rendering an account of
some postmodem views on biological commonalities shared by the human species). For a
discussion of the postmodern "take" on civil society see supra notes 118, 125 and accompanying text.
130 MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION

(1997).

131 Id. at 79.

132 Walzer is quick to point out, however, that the American form of toleration is far from
perfect. Traditionally, minority groups "learned to be quiet." Id. at 95. And certain minority
religious groups [he mentions the Amish and the Hasidim, in particular] were accommodated
"in part by [their] marginality... and in part by their embrace of marginality .. " Id. at 68.
Hence, the dominant culture felt no threat from them.
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ceived of as the peaceful co-existence among groups which are to be
distinguished by "cultural, religious or way-of-life differences,"1133 a distinct but important subset of the nonprofit sector. In this context, he
notes:
...Toleration, remember, is not a formula for harmony:
it legitimates previously repressed or invisible groups
and so enables them to compete for available resources.
But the presence of these groups, in force, will also increase the amount of political space and the number and
range of institutional functions and, therefore, the opportunities for individual participation. And participating
individuals, with a growing sense of their own effectiveness, are our best protection against the parochialism and
intolerance of the groups in which they participate.
Engaged men and women tend to be widely engaged-active in many associations .... This is one of
the most common findings of political scientists and
sociologists .... It helps to explain why engagement
works, in a pluralist society, to undercut racist or chau13 4
vinist political commitments and ideologies.
Professor Walzer concludes, therefore, that it makes good public
policy to encourage the proliferation and strength of these associational
ties that constitute American civil society. 135 As we negotiate the unchartered tundra from a modernist society of dichotomies to a
postmodernist society of "ambiguously identified individuals,"' 136 support of the sector that develops toleration by giving voice to individual
concerns and developing the skills of negotiation and compromise to affect group action would seem to be beyond reproach. Indeed, in an earlier study, undertaken some twenty years ago, the researchers concluded
that, among other attributes, support of diversity or pluralism is the very
hallmark of American representative democracy: 37 "Pluralism means
the lively interaction among inherited particularities and, through election [selection], the evolution of new particularities.' 138 The goal of
public policy in a pluralistic society is to sustain as many particularities
as possible, in the hope that most people will accept, discover, or devise
133

Id.

134 Id. at 107.
135 Id. at 93-112.
136

Id. at 87.

137 PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD

I. NEUHAUS, To EMowER PEOPLE: THE ROLE

OF MEDI-

STRucruRE IN PUBLIC PoLIcY (1977). Interestingly, the context in which the study
occurred presages and parallels contemporary debate over dismantling the "modem welfare
state" and the "strong animus against government." Id. at 1.
138 See id. at 206.
ATING
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one that fits."' 139 The researchers found that, properly conceived, "'E
Pluribus Unum' is not a zero-sum game. . . . [T]he national purpose
indicated by the unum is precisely to sustain the plures,"'14 and leads not
to "balkanization" but to a stronger unum through the creation of "imagi14 1
native accommodations."
These twentieth-century scholars echo Tocqueville's sentiments regarding "those association in civil life which have no political object."' 42
America, Tocqueville discovered, "the most democratic country in the
world now is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest
perfection the art of pursuing in common the objects of common desires
and have applied this new technique to the greatest number of purposes." 14 3 Tocqueville queries, "Is that just an accident, or is there really
some necessary connection between associations and equality."' 144 He
finds that representative democracy is dependent upon a strong associational sector for several reasons. Chief among them is the stabilizing
influence of voluntary associations: "Feelings and ideas are renewed, the
heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal
action of men one upon another. I have show how these influences are
reduced almost to nothing in democratic countries; they must therefore
be articially created, and only associations can do that."' 145 Tocqueville
concludes, "Among laws controlling human societies there is one more
precise and clear, it seems to me, than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become civilized, the art of association must develop
and improve among them at the same speed as equality of conditions
46
spreads."1
This process of inculcating habits of toleration and civility through
associational ties within the nonprofit sector is closely related to a second
role the sector plays in a representative democracy, its unique ability to
develop the democratic skills of self-rule.
2.

The Skills of Self-governance

Tocqueville is usually credited as the first to observe the crucial role
that associations play in the American form of representative democracy.
Indeed, he found the phenomenon of a strong associational sector initially astounding:
139 Id. at 44.

140 Id. at 41.
141 Id. at 41-42.
142 TocQUEVIu.LE, supra note 1, at 513.
143 Id. at 514.
144 Id. For Tocqueville, "equality" was synonymous with "democracy."
supra note 9, at 23, 166.
145 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 515-16.
146 Id. at 517.

See PMRSON,
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As soon as several Americans have conceived a
sentiment or an idea that they want to produce before the
world, they seek each other out, and when found, they
unite. Thenceforth they are no longer isolated individuals, but a power conspicuous from the distance whose
actions serve as an example; when it speaks, men listen.
The first time that I heard in America that one hundred thousand men had publicly promised never to
drink alcoholic liquor, I thought it more of a joke than a
serious matter and for the moment did not see why these
very abstemious citizens could not content themselves
with drinking water by their own firesides.
In the end I came to understand that these hundred
thousand Americans, frightened by the progress of
drunkenness around them, wanted to support sobriety by
One may fancy that if they had
their patronage. ...
lived in France each of these hundred thousand would
have made individual representations to the government
asking it to supervise all the public houses throughout
the realm....
Americans combine to give fetes, found seminaries,
[I]f they want to
build churches, distribute books ....
proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form an association. In every case, at the head of any new undertaking,
where in France you would find the government in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you
are sure to find and association. 147

Tocqueville's keen insights into the unselfconscious activities of the
American nonprofit sector are, thus, not without humor. He also astutely
observed a profound difference between the European tradition of government paternalism and the then fledgling American tradition of grass
roots independence. 148 And it did not escape his discerning eye, nor
should it ours, that this grass roots associational activity is an essential
training ground for self-governance: the experience and practice of problem-solving and united action to achieve associational goals constitutes a
primary educational vehicle for participating in a representative democ-

147 Id. at 512-13; Tocqueville's adventure in the United States coincided with a burgeoning abolition crusade. See PIERSON, supra note 9, at 61.
148 For a discussion of the differences between a tradition of paternalism exemplified by
the political traditions of Eastern and Central Europe see infra discussion Part IV.
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racy, for qualifying citizens to govern.1 49 Thus, in Tocqueville's view,

the nonprofit sector must be encouraged, not to do the work of the public
sector (and, given the tenor of the contemporary debate on nonprofits, it
is undoubtedly prudent to add that it cannot do the work of the public
15 1
sector150 ), but to train citizens to operate the public sector.
Tocqueville's observations are shared by twentieth-century scholars
from a variety of political and philosophical persuasions. For example,
Robert Putnam argues that where the nonprofit sector is strong, participatory democracy is vibrant 52 and Jtirgen Habermas suggests that
associational ties create "communicative interaction" from which emerge
democratic action. 153 Professor Walzer makes the point even more succinctly. 15 4 Noting that the democratic process itself requires negotiation
and compromise in order to reach effective agreement, he observes:
For it is only in the context of associational activity that
individuals learn to deliberate, argue, make decisions,
and take responsibility.... So we need to sustain and
enhance associational ties, even if these ties connect
some of us to some others and not everyone to everyone
else.155

Finally, associational activity not only teaches citizens the skills of government, but it protects citizens from overreaching by the government
1 56
and its counterpart in the private sector: the large corporation.
149 See PIERSON, supra note 9, at 770, 774; TOCQuEVILLE, supra note I, at 514-15 ("But if
[inhabitants of democratic countries] did not learn some habits of acting together in the affairs
of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril. A people in which individuals had lost the
power of carrying through great enterprises by themselves, without acquiring the faculty of
doing them together, would soon fall back into barbarism.").
150 But see Nicholas Lemann, The Limits of Charity, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 28, 1997, at 37
(arguing that charities that serve the poor cannot be a surrogate for public welfare because they
lack sufficient resources).
151 See PIERSON, supra note 9, at 774.
152 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMocRAcY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY (1993) (studying Bologna and the surrounding Emilia-Romagna region of Italy); see
also Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J DEMOCRACY
65 (1995) (warning that America's social capital-features of social organizations such as
networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit-is diminishing).
153 Jtirgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning State "6", in
HERMENEUTICS AND CRIICAL THEORY IN ETHics AND POLITICS 32-51 (Michael Kelly ed.,
1990); see also ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE IDEA OF Civ. SoCIETY 89 n.61 (1995).
154 WALZER, supra note 130, at 97, 105.
155 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 516.
156 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 513, 515 ("It is clear that unless each citizen
learned to combine with his fellows to preserve his freedom at a time when he individually is
becoming weaker and so less able to in isolation to defend it, tyranny would be bound to
increase with equality.... The morals and intelligence of a democratic people would be in as
much danger as its commerce and industry if ever a government wholly usurped the place of
private associations.").
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3.

The Nonprofit Sector as a Buttress Against Public and
Private Sector Hegemony
...

among democratic peoples all the citizens are in-

dependent and weak. They can do hardly anything for
themselves, and none of them is in a position to force his
fellows to help him. They would all therefore find themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other
15 7
voluntarily.
Tocqueville's insight was developed by Berger and Neuhaus in their
landmark study.' 5 8 They describe the "mediating" function the nonprofit
sector plays in "standing between the individual in his private life and the
large institutions ["mega-structures"] of public life."' 59 A strong nonprofit sector, with its ability to marshal grass roots support on an ad hoc
basis, can fetter or impede the exercise of excessive power from any one
160 It
of a number of mega-structures identified by Berger and Neuhaus.
might be said that, in this context, the nonprofit sector acts as a ballast to
prevent the ship of state from capsizing either to port (the public sectorreputedly favored by the political left) or to starboard (the private seetor-reputedly favored by the political right). But Berger and Neuhaus
go further and present a more sophisticated, less self-evident, argument.
They opine that the nonprofit sector 161 mediates between the individual
and mega-structures by giving audible "voice" to individual concerns
and, thereby, maintains the legitimacy of a democratic regime:
Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation,
the political order becomes detached from the values and
realities of individual life. Deprived of its moral foundation, the political order is "delegitirnated." When that
happens, the political order must be secured by coercion
rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy disappears .... That is why mediation is so crucial

to democracy. Such mediation cannot be sporadic and
occasional; it must be institutionalized in structures. The
structures we have chosen to study have demonstrated a
great capacity for adapting and innovating under chang157 Id. at 514 (contrasting that "[ifn aristocratic societies men have no need to unite for
action, since they are held firmly together").
158 BERGER & NEuHAUS, supra note 137, at 1.
159 Id. at 2.
160 Id. at 51.

161 They include within their concept of mediating structures the neighborhood, family,
church and voluntary associations. For purposes of this article, neighborhood and churches are
conceptually subsumed within the category of voluntary associations, while family is considered a part of the individual's private life.
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ing conditions. Most important, they exist where people
are, and that is where sound public policy should always
begin ....
Public policy should protect and foster...
[them;] .

.

. [they] are the value-generating and value-

maintaining agencies in society. Without them, values
become another function of the megastructures .... 162
This, then, describes the three-faceted role assigned to the nonprofit sector in American representative democracy. While it suggests the importance of the sector in these capacities, it fails fully to explicate how
critical the sector is to a perduring democracy. Any teleological rendering of the nonprofit sector would be incomplete without some reference
to the evolution of Western society and theories about society developed
in the Western political tradition because that history manifests the necessarily complex and even dichotomous nature of the sector's role.
B.

THE

NONPROFIT SECTOR IN WESTERN AND POLITICAL THEORY

AND HISTORY:

A

BRIEF RECAPITULATION

Charles Taylor's synopsis of the development of civil society and
theories about civil society in the Western tradition is both illuminating
and useful. 163 He begins with the ancient Greeks' and Romans' notion
that the polity gave a society its exclusive identity: political sovereignty
defined a society. 164 He shows that by the Middle Ages, society and

polity were no longer identical: the political regime shared sovereignty
with Christendom. 165 Christendom was an independent source of authority. 16 6 The State and the Church were subordinate to each other in certain arenas, dominant in others. 167 Another important facet of medieval
society was the notion of reciprocal rights and duties between lord and
subject within the feudal hierarchy. Taylor credits this arrangement as
the progenitor of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rights doctrine,
and he describes it as contractual in nature: the lord owed duties to his
vassal in exchange for the fealty and. obligations owed him by his vassal.168 This fragmentation of power was advanced by the rise of centers
of commerce (cities), the development of commercial codes which furthered the feudal notion of reciprocity and accountability, and the devel169
opment of a court system to enforce that accountability.
162 Id. at 3, 6.
163 Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Society, 3 Pun. CutTURE 95, 96-118 (1990).

164 See id. at 96.
165
166
167
168
169

(1990).

See id. at 97.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 103.
See George Schpflin, The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe, DAEDALUS 55
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Along with the commercial sphere, two other spheres of power and
authority were gradually recognized: the scientific or university sphere
and the sphere of municipal government. 170 "The upshot of this pattern
of development in the West was to create a political ethos in which the
right to participate was tacitly accepted in theory, even if denied in practice.' 171 The other characteristic that emerged from this pattern was not
only the acceptance of the fragmentation of power and the resulting complexity of relationships among loci of power, but the recognition that this
complexity itself was "a normal feature of life."'1 72 Armed with these
historical developments, by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
Western countries were able to rid themselves of claims of absolutist
authority by the Monarch and by the Church. 173 Along with these political changes, there emerged a body of political theory which justified and
17 4
rationalized them.
Among theorists of the period, Taylor sees John Locke as perhaps
the most emblematic: Locke's notion that human society pre-dates and
is superior to the state that it constructs; his idea that the State is constrained by a contractual arrangement with its citizens of reciprocal rights
and duties; and his insistence that God's law through operation of natural
law is the ultimate sovereign to which the polity is beholden are directly
related to the historical evolution of Western polities and of political theories that inform that evolution. 175 Above all, Locke's theory is illustrative of, and justifies, the fragmentation of power which characterizes the
Western political tradition. 176 By contrast, Taylor views Montesquieu's
theory as reminiscent of the ancient Greeks and Romans with his identification of society with the political authority. 17 7 But Montesquieu also
presages another kind of fragmentation because he also views civil society as a separate force: "as an equilibrium between central power and a
170 Id at 59. Schtipflin says this about these four subsets of authority within Western
societies: the relative autonomy of the law was reluctantly accepted by the ruler owing to the
commercial demands for predictability and relative transparency; the Church was eventually
forced to recognize an independent commercial sphere in spite of its ban on usury (and, by
extension, on interest) because of the growing strength of the monied class and their network

of transboundary trade. The universities were able to free themselves from the yoke of the

Church when, by the thirteenth century, the concept of speculative thought (as opposed to rote
memorization of religiously accepted facts) began to be recognized as an important intellectual
discipline. This "shift from rote to conceptualism gradually resulted in the claim to an autonomous scientific sphere through the secularization of learning." Id. Finally, municipalities attained a significant degree of autonomy because the economic power and specialized learning
there afforded municipalities a measure of political leverage. See id. 58-60.
171 Id at 61.
172 Id. at 60.
173

See id.; Taylor, supra note 163, at 103-04.

174

See Schtpflin, supra note 169, at 57-61.

Taylor, supra note 163, at 21-26, 29-30.
See id. at 104.
177 Id.
175
176
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skein of entrenched rights." 178 At this point Taylor develops a perspective of the evolving theories of civil society in Western thought that is
critical to an understanding of the complex nature of the role nonprofits
179
play in society.
Having described Montesquieu's Janus-like theory which contains
both the concept of the primacy of the political sphere and the notion of
civil society as standing apart from the state and acting as a counterpoise
or equilibrium between the state and "a skein of entrenched rights," Taylor then identifies two divergent and competing models of civil society
which have developed in Western thought.180 The first he calls the "Lstream" (homologous to Lockeian theory), and within it he finds a view
of civil society as "extra-political" and public. 18 1 The second he dubbs
the "M-stream" (its philosophical antipode which rests on Montesquieu's
construct).1

82

A major component of civil society in "L-stream" theory is the
economy, the private sector, the authority of which is derived from its
own free market rules (Adam Smith's "invisible hand") and not from the
state. 183 Hence, it is extra-political, but it is also public in the sense that
it operates outside the private sphere of the family. The eighteenth-century conception of a self-regulating free market economy was adopted by
Karl Marx (interpreting and responding to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel) who considered civil society to be coterminous with this economy. 184 Another fragmentation of power occurred in the eighteenth cen-

tury with the recognition of "public opinion" as an authority. 18 5 With the
advent of printing technology "public opinion is elaborated entirely
outside the channels and public spaces of the political structure."' 186 It,
too, has been and will continue to be both extra-political and public.
These two eighteenth-century phenomena lent credence to the
evolving idea in Western theory that civil society had an existence independent of the political authority which the political authority was constrained to recognize and to respect. This was fragmentation that differed
in kind from prior limitations on political sovereignty. Political authority
had previously been limited by loci of power, like the Church or the
economy, with separate spheres of authority. But, before the advent of
"public opinion," the political sphere-the State's bailiwick-was the
178 Id. at 106.

See id. at 107.
180 See id.
179

181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See id.

185 See id.
186 Id. at 109.
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exclusive province for disseminating secular social policies.18 7 This notion of civil society, that it "has its own pre-political [public] life and
unity, which the political structure must serve," constitutes the L-stream
version of civil society. As an example, the writings of Thomas Paine
follow that model, and in the intervening centuries other radical thinkers
have adopted the L-stream as a theoretical vehicle not only as a justification for self-determination (as did Paine: the people are entitled to overthrow an illegitimate government because civil society stands apart from
and has ultimate authority over the state' 88 ) but also to "marginalize" or
eliminate government altogether.' 8 9 This latter version of the L-stream
was adopted by Jean Jacques Rousseau and later by Friedrich Engels. 9 0
Thus, the L-stream rationale of the civil society can lead to dangerous
infringements on liberty and even to the destruction of civil society itself.
The specters of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are reminders of the
terrible anomaly that tyranny can emerge from a theory premised upon
liberation. Taylor points to another potential excess which inheres in the
L-stream version of civil society:
But in a more subtle way, the politics of marginalizing
politics has also been seen as posing a threat to freedom.
This is particularly so when the sphere of society in the
name of which the political is being marginalized is that
of the self-regulating economy. For in this domain the
disposition of things in society as a whole is seen as arising not out of any collective will or common decision,
but by an "invisible hand."' 9'
This appeal to "blind," and therefore, apparently objective economic
forces is a trap for the unwary because it exalts the private pursuit of gain
to the exclusion of all other values, and it rewards the victors in that
competition to the detriment of other interests. Thus, the danger of the
L-stream of civil society theory is that it can lead to a tyranny of the left
or of the right.
Taylor turns, then, to the M-stream.192 It is premised upon Montesquieu's rendering of the ancients' view that society and the state are synonymous, but that excesses of the state are held in check by subdividing
and apportioning power within the political sphere, and non-political as
187

See id.

188 Thomas Paine, On First Principles of Government, in THE THOMAS PAiNE READER

452, 459 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987) (1795).
189 See Taylor, supra note 163, at 112.
190 See id. at 112-13.
191 Id. at 113.
192 Id.
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193
well as political purposes are pursued within the political system itself.
Representative of this version of civil society is Tocqueville's counsel
that voluntary associations are to be encouraged by the state in a democracy because they teach the skills of self-governance. 194 But, as we have
seen, at the very core of the tradition of Western democracy is the notion
that fragmentation of authority and some degree of autonomy from the
political sphere, from the state, is essential in securing liberties and maintaining representative democracies. And critics from the "New Social
Movements" in Europe decry the partnership of the nonprofit sector and
195
government as the worst sort of "corporatism."'
Hence, our contemporary notion of what a civil society or the nonprofit sector is, or should be, lies within the tension created by two conflicting versions-what Taylor identifies as the "L-stream" (civil society
is separate from the political sphere) and the "M-stream" (civil society is
part of the political sphere). It is instructive to notice that because each
version or "stream" acts as a check on the potential excesses of the other,
it can be postulated that the most beneficial form of civil society, or
nonprofit sector, will present a somewhat amorphous, dichotomous visage because it will be seen to act in tandem with the political sphere in
some respects and to maintain an almost puritanical autonomy from government in other respects.
This is a fairly accurate description of the nonprofit sector in historical and in contemporary America. 196 Perhaps we should ask whether
calls to reform the sector to restore it to its "original purity" (as entirely
independent of government) are well-advised. Historically, the nonprofit
sector has never been entirely autonomous; it has received support from,
197
and supplemented the work of, the public sector since colonial times.
Further, the simplistic appeal of L-stream thought which envisions civil
society as entirely autonomous belies the despotic dangers inherent in
both of its versions: the Rousseau-Marxian notion of civil society as the
supremacy of the common will and the free market version of civil society as the supremacy of objective and benign economic forces. Above
all, it is essential that we clearly define the United States nonprofit sector
as reflecting a hybrid of Western theory: a hybrid whose contradictory
attributes find justification in historical experience. Understanding the
193 See id.
194 See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 514.
195 See id. at 97-101, 115.
196 See Brody, supra note 107, at 457 (a somewhat different account that reaches the same

conclusion: that the U.S. nonprofit sector is, perforce, a hybrid of amorphous and changing
contours).
197 See Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 112 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
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justification for the amorphous contours of the sector better equips us to
evaluate recent legislative proposals for reform.
There is one more perspective upon which we might draw to advance our understanding of how the nonprofit sector operates, what services it performs in a representative democracy. That is, the perspective
that views the sector through the experiences of post-communist Central
European countries as they struggle to develop democratic governments.
IV.

A.

THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: THE VIEW FOR
CENTRAL EUROPE

A STUDY IN CONTRASTS: EVOLUTIONARY DIVERGENCE IN
EASTERN EUROPEAN AND WESTERN POLITICAL TRADITIONS

While the Western tradition is characterized by the fragmentation of
power, the Eastern tradition typifies concentrated, unified power. Eastern and Central Europe were influenced by both traditions, but the state
has always been clearly dominant. 198 Even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these countries were unable to wrest sufficient political
power from the sovereign to institute true parliamentary democracies. 199
An occasional overthrow of existing regimes represented not an expression of popular will but discord within the ruling elite.20 0 Any citizen
autonomy permitted reflected either ancient custom or the political elite's
hypocritical homage to international public opinion.2 0 ' Between the lateEnlightenment and the mid-nineteenth century, the political elites in
Eastern and Central Europe did make some attempt to emulate Western
modernity, but they did so by adopting its form, not its substance.
The problem was that the substance of Western tradition required
the fragmentation of loci of power: "the existence of comparably strong
autonomous spheres and centers of power in Western Europe on which a
new 'modern' political system relying on civil society could be
based .... ,202 But in Eastern Europe and Central Europe an autonomous
civil society had never developed. Thus, the elitist modernizers in these
countries were "involved in a contradiction, that of having to construct
civil society from above ....
[Ihis proved impossible, not surpris198 See Sch6pffin, supranote 169, at 62. Sch~pflin describes Central Europe as less stat-

ist than Eastern Europe. However, in Central Europe historically the ruler shared power not
with the citizens, generally, but only with the nobility. State power was maintained, in part, by
the political principle that the ruler was free to dominate any field not expressly prohibited by
law or custom (a variant of the royal prerogative) and society was never strong enough to limit
the reach of state power with success. See id. at 63-67.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 63.
201 See id.
202 Id. at 64.
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ingly." 20 3 No independent free market sector was permitted to develop,
as it had in the West.20 4 Old elites, faced with instituting economic mo-

dernity joined the state's risk-free bureaucracy rather than the risk-intensive entrepreneurial class. 20 5 "Only in the Czech lands of Bohemia and

Moravia did anything like a native entrepreneurial class succeed in
achieving a [viable] political position ....,,206 Interestingly, the Czech
experience bears witness to the fact that a relatively independent eco-

nomic sector alone is insufficient leverage with which to achieve a representative democracy: "In all, the Czech experience suggests that even
with patterns of development close to those of the West, especially industrialization and the existence of a native entrepreneurial class, these
do not in themselves guarantee the evolution of a Western-style political
system ....

"1207

Along with an autonomous commercial sphere, the development of
municipalities with some autonomy was crucial in the fragmentation of
political power in the West. The city was also the situs of the development of commercial codes that furthered the feudal idea of reciprocal
rights and obligations and predictable legal results. 208 The interaction of
these three forces within the city created additional fragmentation-in
the form of specialized expertise-and "continuous exchanges, economic and social, in which transactions of growing complexity could be
' '20 9
played out.
In Eastern and Central Europe, by contrast, there were few cities of
size, even by the eighteenth century. 2 10 Those cities that did develop
urban density did not develop a similar complexity because they were
either developed as the seats of government administration, like Vienna,
and therefore dominated by the political elite and bureaucratic classes, or
they were developed as enclaves of declining cultures. 2 11 The municipalities that emerged in Eastern and Central Europe were not bastions of
entrepreneurial activity.
By the end of World War I, while the countries of Eastern and Central Europe were almost universally democratic countries, they were only
nominally democratic in the Western sense of representative democracies. 2 12 In fact, these countries continued to be dominated by their tradi203

Id.

204
205

See id.
See id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.

206
207

208 See id.
209

Id. at 68.

210 See id.
211 See id.
212 See id.
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tional political elites. 2 13 While the make-up of these elites differed from
country to country they were all characterized by traditional authoritarianism in the form of a government party, administering a "pseudo-parliamentarian form of government with actual power residing in an elite
bureaucracy. The dominant bureaucracies permitted some dissent within
2 14
the parliaments but never enough to threaten their hegemony."
In sum, the World War II period was characterized by a continuation of the ancient r6gimes in Eastern and Central Europe, under
whatever democratic nomenclature in which power was maintained by a
political elite such that the political sphere dominated society and gave it
its identity. The Second World War created massive upheavals and
deep-rooted changes in attitudes within these countries, but any positive
change wrought by these dislocations in the political development of the
area was cut short by the Communist era. 215 That era, of course, continued the hegemonical primacy of a political elite which not only was
dominant, but virtually obliterated any development of what might be
called a "civil society."
B.

POsT-COMMuNISM AND THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES OF EASTERN

AND CENTRAL EUROPE

As Eastern and Central European countries seek to rid themselves of
the vestiges of the Communist monolith and to institute viable democracies, the successful fragmentation of power has proved a daunting challenge. In these countries consideration of the role the nonprofit sector, or
2 16
the "civil society" might play has received considerable attention.
Since the evidence is compelling that neither the forms of democracy
(the franchise, political parties, and so forth), nor the dynamics of a free
market economy alone, can effect a Western-style representative democracy,2 17 scholars debate the efficacy of a strong civil society as providing
the necessary counterweight to and fragmentation of political and private
(market) power.2 18 Democracy 21 9 has assumed normative, if not numinous proportions in the post-communist era:
213 See id. at 70.
214 Id. at 71.
215 See id. at 87.
216 See Taylor, supra note 163,
217 See SEIGMAN, supra note

at 95-99.
153, at 178. Seligman quotes a Hungarian survey in a

forthcoming work by G. Csepali & A. Orkeny, The Twilight of State Socialism (forthcoming)

(manuscript on file with author). The data indicated no correlation between entrepreneurial
activity and democratic values. Accord Sch6pflin, supra note 169, at 64 (identifying Czech
experience).
218 See SmEioMAN, supra note 153, at 179.

219 In this article, the term includes the various kinds of representative democracy that
have proved successful in the West. No attempt is made to distinguish between or evaluate the
relative merits of parliamentary verses presidential forms, with or without a written constitu-
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Increasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative expectation of the
community of states. This recognition has led to the
emergence of a community expectation: that those who
seek the validation of their empowerment may only govern with the consent of the governed. Democracy, thus,
is on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that
increasingly will be promoted and protected by collec220
tive international processes.
This impetus to institute a substantive form of representative democracy does not simply reflect a craving to be globally "p.c." In order
22
to secure a market share in the burgeoning regional trade consortiums, '
or to be a player in the real politik of regional geopolitics,

22 2

a nation's

credentials must increasingly include viable democratic processes and
enforceable human rights standards. The idea of an entitlement to democracy is also evidenced in the United Nations' formative documents.22 3 For countries in Eastern and Central Europe the sine qua non
of regional association is the European Community, the membership requirements of which parallel in many respects these universally recognized United Nations (U.N.) norms. 224 Thus, the new constitutions of
tion. Obviously, each nation-state must select, borrow, and fine-tune its own form to fit its
own indigenous customs and institutions.
220 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 56 (1992).
221 See, e.g., Steven Kinzer, Brussels Meeting Dims Turks' Hopes, N.Y. TIMES hrr'L,
Mar. 11, 1997, at A7 (Turkey recently lost its bid to join the European Union because its
"democratic" practices were deemed less than exemplary.); cf Celestine Bohlen, Europeans
Celebrate Unity and Chafe at New Frictions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at A5; Stephen
Kinzer, Europeans Shut the Door on Turkey's Membership in Union, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,

1997, at A9.
222 See, e.g., Accord on a New NATO, N.Y. TuviMEs, July 6, 1997, at A4. (reporting that
Slovenia and Romania were refused membership in NATO, while Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic were admitted). For background on the geopolitics of the new NATO see
generally PHILIP ZELIKOW & CONDOLEEZZA RICE, GERMANY UNIFIED AND EUROPE TRANSFORMED: A STUDY IN STATECRAFT (1997); ROBERT L. HUrCHINGS, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF U.S. POLICY IN EUROPE, 19891992 (1997); JUAN J. LNz & ALFRED STEPHAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE DAwN OF PEACE IN EUROPE

(1997);

(1997).

223 See Franck, supra note 220, at 62. Franck identifies the following U.N. "democratizing" instruments: Article 76 of the U.N. Charter mandates the right of a people to determine
their own collective political formation (the Right of Self-Determination); the right of free
expression is mandated by the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948; the right of freedom of opinion, and expression and
assembly and association are memorialized in Articles 18, 19, and 22 of the Charter; and the
right to participate in the political process is mandated in Articles 21 and 25. See id.
224 For a sophisticated discussion of agreements between the European Community and
Eastern and Central European countries see ANDREw EVANS, THE INTEGRATION OF THE EURoPEAN COMMUNITY AND THIRD STATES IN EUROPE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1996).
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these "emerging democracies" consistently recognize the basic rights associated with and recognized by the U.N. community as requisite to
225
democracy.
Drawn by the economic benefits associated with membership in the
European community, Eastern and Central European countries have pursued membership with varying degrees of commitment and success. The
forty-year hiatus in trade relationships between Western Europe and
these countries created by the Communist era, in addition to anomalies in
economic infrastructures and political institutions, have obviously created significant impediments to post-communist alliances between the
Western Europe, and Eastern and Central Europe. 226 However, even in
the twilight of Communist rule, tentative initiatives were advanced. The
European Community signed trade agreements with Czechoslovakia and
Hungary in 1988, followed by similar agreements with Poland in
1989.227 After the astonishing series of successful revolutions against
Communism in 1989 and 1990, the European Community committed it228
self to assist the emerging democracies through various programs.
These programs have served as a foundation from which the Central European countries have pursued full membership in the European Community. 229 Initiatives in that respect have culminated in Agreements
("European Agreements") which confer on these countries the, status of
"Associates," with certain trade benefits and formats for political cooper230
ation, but no firm promise that they will be granted full membership.
However, in June, 1994, the Copenhagen European Council committed
itself to confer membership on any associate that proved able to comply
225 The provisions of these new constitutions (including those of Bulgaria, Croatia, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic
and Slovenia) are found in TiH REBiRTH OF DEmocRAcy: 12 CONSTITUTIONS OF CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EtmoPE (2d ed., 1996). The introduction to the volume gives an overview of these

constitutions, noting, inter alia, that they provide for free elections, grant legal status to dissenting parties, offer safeguards of human rights and uphold the principles of democratic plu-

ralism. l at 5. Typically they are based on the German parliamentary model, rather than the
American presidential model. See id. at 7.

226 For an overview of the relationships between Western Europe and Communist satellites during the Communist era see John Vincent, The Visagrad Countriesof CentralEuropeIntegrationor Isolation?, 2 MIN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 229 (1993).
227 See id. at 234.
228 The PHARE Program to assist Poland and Hungary, initially, was extended to include
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. It is administered by the European Commission. It
not only provided aid but also lifted some of the trade restrictions imposed during the communist era. See id. at 235. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was formed
to render assistance in developing a free market economy in the emerging democracies. See

id. at 236.
229 For a discussion of the institutional framework of the Community see Ulrich Everling,
Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, 29 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 1053 (1992).
230 See John F. Casalino, Shaping Environmental Law and Policy of Centraland Eastern
Europe: The European Union's Critical Role, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. 1. 227 (1995).

588

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7:555

with membership requirements. 23 1 Moreover, the Essen European Council in December of that year developed a program to assist associates in
232
securing membership.
The program includes not only ongoing communications through
ministerial meetings but also a White Paper Preparationof the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the
Internal Market of the Union (White Paper),2 33 which identifies with
some specificity the requirements for acceptance into the Internal Market, a precursor to full membership in the Community. 234 The White
Paper is designed to assist the emerging democracies in aligning their
laws and policies with Community standards in the following major areas: "customs law, company [corporate or business association] law,
banking law, accounting and taxation of businesses, intellectual property,
protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, protection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect rules and standards, transport and the
environment. '' 235 In addition, an annex to the White Paper sets forth key
legislation in all sectors of society which must be implemented before an
236
associate can gain admission to the Internal Market.
Clearly the European Agreements and the White Paper are heavily
freighted toward rules concerning the marketplace (the private sector)
and the elimination of trans-boundary trade barriers. But the documents
and the consultation process they institute also evince a concern for the
political landscape in which the entrepreneurial game is played. The European Community's economic and political interest in encouraging stable democracies as well as prosperous economies is evident. 237 Indeed,
it is widely accepted that a principal reason for the acceptance of Spain,
Greece and Portugal into the Community was to buttress the stability of
their nascent democracies. 238 Conversely, the Community has previously suspended trade with Greece when it temporarily rejected democratic principles. 2 39 With regard to the White Papercovering the market
accession strategy of Eastern and Central European countries, it specifically states, at § 6.1:
231 See id. at 239-40.
232 See id. at 240.
233 Id. at 243; see also EU/East Europe:A White PaperApprovedfor Nine CEECs, European Information Services, June 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Euro-East file.
234 See Casalino, supra note 230, at 243.
235 Id. at 242.
236 Id. at 244-45; cf Vincent, supra note 226, at 244.
237 See Vincent, supra note 226, at 255-56.
238 See id. at 261.
239 See id. at 265.
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Transition in central and eastern Europe to political
and economic systems compatible with those in the European Union is a complex process. It involves the
strengthening of democracy and civil society, the implementation of sound macro-economic policies, privatization and industrial restructuring, legal and institutional
changes and trade liberalization, aiming at free trade
with the Union and with neighboring countries.2 40
Thus, even at this preliminary stage of guiding the associate countries
into the Internal Market, the White Paperrecognizes and makes accommodation for certain lessons drawn from the political traditions of both
the East and the West. Tradition teaches that true democratizing reform
requires more than mere "approximation of legislation" but must also
entail substantive implementation in the form of enforceable laws, legal
structures and processes.24 1 It also shows that fragmentation of power
protected by legal rules and processes is an important part of democratic
reform. 24 2 Further, it shows that an autonomous free market forms a
crucial part of that fragmentation, and that associational life in the
broader sense (including not only private sector associations but civil
society as well) should be protected by Company Law provisions. 24 3
Driven by the exigencies of regional trade with their more prosperous
Western neighbors, these emerging democracies have strong incentives
to implement substantive democratic reforms which recognize the Western tradition of fragmentation of power. Even at the pre-accession level
of consultation, White Paperguidelines with their principal focus on establishing a free market infrastructure, and privatization (private sector
concern) maintenance of an autonomous civil society (the nonprofit asso244
ciational sector) are recognized as an important aspect of democracy.
Both from the historical perspective of Western tradition and from contemporary efforts to extend that tradition eastward, civil society is considered to play an important role. However, that concept is not
universally accepted.
C.

Tim TENuous CrviL SocmrY-A POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE

An interesting theory of civil society is advanced by Adam Seligman in his recent work, The Idea of Civil Society.2 45 Professor Seligman
240 See Casalino, supra note 230, at 243 (emphasis added).
241 See hi

242 Chapter 2 of the White Paper recognizes the principle of free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital as essential. See id.
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 SELiGMAN, supra note 153, at 3.
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acknowledges the importance of civil society within the Western tradition246 and he recognizes the centrality of the concept in the current debates about the development of democratic norms in Eastern and Central
Europe (and their revival in the United States). 247 But he believes the
attention given to the concept is misplaced. 248 Succinctly put, Seligman
fears that the concept of civil society is incapable of fulfilling the roles to
which it has been assigned because the "first principles" upon which it
has traditionally rested in the West have been seriously undermined in
this postmodern era.2 49 He labels those "first principles" as "revelation"
(the appeal to natural law) 2 50 and "reason" (the appeal to the Protestant
25 1
Ethic).
Seligman begins his chronological rendition of the historical development of the ideal of civil society, as did Taylor,252 with the ancients.
But he views those ancient roots through a somewhat different prism. He
begins with the internalization of natural law ("God is providence") following the breakdown of the Greek city-state and its reconceptualization
by the Stoics as "right reason" 253-Cicero's term for the internalization
of God's order in man's mind by way of natural law.2 54 Hence, the immutable principles of natural law were accessible to and binding on
man's social order:2 55 "A set of fundamental or ultimate principles of
justice-rooted in the cosmic order itself-is thus seen to stand at the
basis of enacted law."'256 The Church Fathers reworked and modified
these principles from the twelfth century to the sixteenth century, interjecting the Church as the principle intermediary between God and man in
257
this hierarchy of received Truth.
In the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, natural law
regained its stature during the Reformation, although the anti-absolutists
still opposed to the concept of the divine right of kings. 25 8 The writings
of Hugo Grotius consolidated the ideas promulgated by this political
metamorphosis and established the foundations for "modern natural
law"-a return to the stoical idea of "right reason" as the internalization
246

Id. at ix, 3.

247

255

Id. at ix, 2-3.
See id.at 13.
See id.at 1.
See id.at 15-17.
See id.at 1.
See Taylor, supra note 163, at 96 and accompanying text.
See SELIGMAN, supra note 153, at 17.
See id.
See id.

256

Id.

257

See id.at 19.
See id.

248
249

250
251
252
253

254
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of God's law through the good offices of natural law.259 This tradition of
natural law became a cornerstone in Revolutionary America's rejection
of the English Crown as sovereign and in Scottish Enlightenment thought
260
upon which much of American Revolutionary thought was premised.
Seligman identifies John Locke's work as being of fundamental importance to American Revolutionary thought.26 ' It too relied heavily on
Grotius's work but also, importantly, on Calvinist theology: that man's
right to equality, liberty and democracy is not a license to the unbridled
pursuit of pleasure, but rather an opportunity to perform God's works in
the community. 262 "The different structures of political authority found
in the world are all derived from the individual's own executive and legislative authority in the state of nature, which individuals hold in their
'capacity of agents of God.' "263 Locke's a priori construct of the theoretical basis of civil society became increasingly problematic as the homogeneity of an agrarian culture gave way to the heterogeneity created
by urban, industrial, expansionist developments in the mid to late eighteenth century. 264 Seligman shows how Locke's ontology was gradually
undermined by the crisis of faith and community purpose that has finally
come to characterize the postmodern world.265 In theoretical discourse,
the supernal rationale of civil society gradually receded, and with it the
notion of mutuality, of reciprocal validation, of commonality of concerns
and-indeed-the concept of a common-weal. 266 Seligman explores the
development of America's iconic rendering of civil society, reiterating
how the extension of citizenship undermined concepts of mutuality and
universality.2 67 Finally, he extends his analysis to Eastern and Central
Europe, noting that the pluralistic nature of the populations there makes
268
the task of constituting a civil society daunting.
In sum, Seligman concludes that "the problems of society-in the
West as in Eastern and Central Europe-are, in essence, the problems of
constituting trust in Society. ' 2 69 Trust requires a sense of mutual regard
and common concerns that simply do not abide in the postmodern contemporary world because that world lacks a universally acceptable ethi259 See

id.

260 See id. at 22.

See id.
See id.
263 Id.at 23-24.
264 See id. at 30.
265 See id.
266 See id. at 31-58.
267 See id. at 59-144.
268 See id. at 145-98.
269 See id. at 13.
261

262
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cal norm.2 70 It was the ethical norm that made the concept of civil
society viable in the Western tradition. 271 In turn, such norms rested on
the dual notions of "revelation" and "reason," which served to synthesize
conflicting interests of the individual and the community: "We, however,
live amid the debris of Reason. The 'Rights of Reason,' as final arbitrators of ethical and moral dilemmas, have in this century increasingly
been questioned, most recently by a plethora of postmodern philosophies. '272 Hence, we face the virtual demise of civil society-cut off
from the roots that sustained it.
Professor Seligman's treatise is an important addition to the debate
on the role of nonprofit associations-the civil society-in a representa-

tive democracy. Within the parameters he has drawn for the subject, his
analysis has significant merit. Its problems lie not with the merits of his
analysis but with its scope and its definitional limitations. A brief comparison between Taylor's273 and Seligman's thesis will serve to make the
point.
Taylor describes civil society variously as a sector of society that
"exists over and against the state, in partial independence from it,"274 and
"a web of autonomous associations, independent of the state." 275 And he
adds that while there has been a tendency toward "corporatism" (the integration of these associations into the state or public sector-especially in
modern industrial democracies like Germany and Japan), 276 "there are

lots of associations in Western societies which are not involved in corporatist-type negotiations. Some are capable of having an impact on policy by lobbying or public campaigns, while others are marginal and easy

270 See id. at 129 ("[T]he postmodern position challenges traditional belief in the accessibility of the 'good' to the workings of reason... stress[ing] the limits of language (reason) and
its essential inability to articulate the summum bonum. The 'good' cannot be articulated and so
cannot be subject to a discourse of reason."). He summarizes postmodern philosophy on this
issue as follows:
The core of the postmodern position can in fact be presented in two central and
related themes: (1) an attack on the existence of universals ... and (2) an attack on
the philosophy of the subject (best illustrated by Foucault's by now famous quip that
'man is an invention of recent date and one perhaps nearing its end [footnote omitted].' This position is, of course, in marked contrast to that of modernity, with its
focus on the individual subject and belief in the accessibility of the 'good' and the
'true' (universals) to the workings of reason.
Id.
271 See id.

272 Id. at 1.
273 Taylor, supra note 163, at 95 and accompanying text.
274 Id.

275 Id. at 96.
276 See id.

1998]

THE ROLE

oF NoNPRoFrrs

to ignore. '277 Thus, the idea and the reality of civil society includes,
says Taylor, both an "L-stream" and an "M-stream." 278
Recall that the M-stream reverts to the ancient notion of the polity
and the society as co-terminous, so that civil society is but a subset of the
public sector. 279 Power is divided into the public (government), private
(entrepreneurial) and civil (nonprofit) sectors which gives the representative democracy its stability through diversity and fragmentation of
power.2 80 A modem example of M-stream thought is the corporatism
alluded to above. In contrast, the L-stream views the civil society as
separate from the polity--"an extra-political reality." "One facet of...
[L-stream thought] ... is the view of civil society as an economy which
operates apart from and under a separate set of rules from the public
sector." 28 1 The eighteenth-century development of an economy, and a
public opinion separate from the public sector "are two ways in which
society can come to some unity or co-ordination outside of political
structures. '2 82 This facet of L-stream thought leads to a marginalizaton
of the public sphere. Civil society "has its own pre-political life and
unity which the political structure must serve." 283 "The self-regulating
economy and public opinion... give body to the Lockean idea, which in
turn has medieval roots, that society has its own [pre-eminent] identity
outside the political dimension. '284 A modem example of the marginalizing facet of L-stream thought is contemporary conservative political
theory: the economy (private sector) should dominate public policy; the
public sector is marginalized by and should serve the interests of the
2 85
private sector.
Another facet of L-stream thought seeks to obliterate the state and
replace it with a pre-eminent popular will. A line of theorists from Rousseau through Marx 2 86 have espoused this view and its modem incarnation was the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. and China.
There "[a] strange and horrifying reversal has taken place, whereby an
idea whose roots lie in a pre-political conception of society can now justify the total subjection of life to an enterprise of political transformation. '2 87 The Western tradition, according to Taylor, is best understood
as including both L-stream and M-stream considerations and the left and
277 IM2at 96-97.
278 See id.

279 See

280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287

id.

See id. at 114.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 111.
See id.
at 109.
See id.
See id. at 112-13.
Id. at 113.
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right variants of L-stream thought.288 He also suggests that the best rendering of the idea of civil society will hold these contradictory views in
2 89
balance so that each will act as a check on the excesses of the other.
The all-inclusiveness of Taylor's approach has much to recommend
it. The "biodiversity" of Taylor's conception of civil society differs
markedly from Seligman's rendition. 290 While Taylor avoids the dichotomies of the variants of Western theory by including them, 29 1 Seligman

seems to become entrapped by the contradictions of L-stream thought
and its consequent problems with the dualities of public verses individual
or private concerns. 292 A related distinction between the two scholars is
the pre-eminence of theory over historical fact in Seligman, 293 while
Taylor treats the same material through a prism which emphasizes historical reality over theory. 294 The result is that Seligman is confronted with

a two-fold problem.
First, the linearity of his theoretical chronology gives a primacy to
postmodern thought (and before it, the now discredited Marxist version
of L-stream theory) which can lead precipitously to a conclusion that
civil society no longer has a viable role to play in representative democracy. 295 Taylor's historical chronology of the way civil society actually
developed in the West leaves him free to see any variant of theory as
simply one among several that must be included in the mix in order to do
296
justice to the concept and to retain an important balance among them.
Second, the dominance of the theoretical justifications in Seligman's thesis creates an undue emphasis on the ethical component of civil society-a component which he believes has lost its theoretical
underpinnings (revelation and reason).2 97 Again, by emphasizing historical reality over theory, Taylor is able to include far more than Christian
and ancient ethical canon as foundation for the civil sector.29 8 Experientially the actual development of civil society had no apparent problem
with including the full gamut of motives in the development of civil society-selfish and individualistic as well as philanthropic and charitable.
Hence, on the one hand, Taylor's conception is much more open to an
evolving or changing theoretical justification for the sector.2 99 Seligman,
288 See id.

289 See id. at 117.
290 Id.
291 SELIGMAN, supra note 153, at 4.
292 See id. at 61-66.
293 See id. at 86-91.
294 See Taylor, supra note 163, at 101.
295 See id. at 102.
296 See SELIGMAN, supra note 153, at 59-99.
297 See Taylor, supra note 163, at 105.
298 See SELIGMAN, supra note 153, at 59-71.
299 See Taylor, supra note 163, at 107.
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on the other hand, sees "the core component of the classical idea of civil
society as an ethical vision of social life. ' '3°° Because he sees this ethical
vision as relying upon doctrines of natural law and "right reason"-doctrines which he believes no longer command the allegiance of the
postmodern citizen-he is constrained to conclude that civil society is
30 1
probably an untenable construct.
In his treatise, Seligman gives special attention to Eastern and Central Europe because there appears to be a real effort to develop civil society 302 in that region. Constituting civil society in those countries appears
to face formidable obstacles, such as, a lack of civic tradition and a pluralism consisting of highly contentious ethnic, religious and naturalist
groups.30 3 These special problems are endemic to those countries, as is
the universal problem of the postmodern condition. 30 4 With that in mind,
it might prove useful to review the experience of one of these emerging
democracies, the Slovak Republic, and to ask whether the lugubrious
projections of postmodern thought necessarily signal the death-knell of
civil society.
D.

THE

REPRESSION OF CivIL SocIETY:

THE

SLOVAKIAN EXPERIENCE

1. HistoricalSynopsis
Slovakia is considered to be the least westernized of the four
Visagrad countries. 305 Witness, for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (N.A.T.O.) recent rejection of Slovakia's candidacy for
membership. 30 6 Slovakia's status both as a sovereign nation and as an
emerging democracy, however, is of very recent vintage.
300
301
302
303

SELGMrAN,

supra note 153, at 10.

See id.at 7.
See id.
See id. at 179.
304 See WA.ZER, supra note 130, at 88.
305 Evidence of that point is seen in its failure to gain membership in NATO this year,
while the other three Visagrad countries-Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary-joined
the alliance. Indeed, Slovakia was not even considered to be a finalist (France supported the
candidacy of Slovenia and Romania, as well). See Craig R. Whitney, 3 Former Members of
Eastern Bloc Invited into NATO, N.Y. TnMEs, July 9, 1997, at Al.
The Visagrad Countries (originally three in number-Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary-were so named by the press ("the Visagrad Three" or the "Visagrad Trojka" or
"Visagrad Triangle") when those three countries met in Visagrad, Hungary in 1991, following
the overthrow of Communist regimes, to discuss joint efforts to join the European Community.
Those efforts culminated in a joint statement of purpose: "Declaration of the Hungarian Republic, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, and the Polish Republic, on Cooperation
Leading to European Integration." Lidiya Kosikova, Eastern Europe: The Visagrad Triangle-A New Cooperation Structure in Europe, REuTER TErrL'E FOREIGN TRADE, Apr. 19,
1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, AllwId File. Since the separation of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak republics the group is typically called the Visagrad Four.
306 See Kosikova, supra note 305 and accompanying text.

596

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7:555

For a thousand years, until the end of World War I,
Slovakia was part of the Hungarian kingdom.... It was,
for centuries, a part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.
For seven decades of the twentieth century, Slovakia
was part of the Czechoslovak state ....
It existed within
a Central European environment ... [sharing with surrounding peoples] a heritage of authoritarianism and nationalism, provincialism and opportunism. . . . When
Slovakia became a part of the Czechoslovak Republic in
1918, the smaller Slovak nation consisted mostly of a
rural population and had reached a lower level of economic and educational development than the Czech
30 7
nation.
Thus, Slovakia is representative of the Eastern and Central European nations discussed by both Taylor and Seligman, sharing with other countries in the region traditions of paternalism, rather than Western
individualism, and unified structures of power, rather than diverse structures which have fragmented power in the West. But Slovakia is also
distinctive, in that its experience with statehood is limited.30 8 Slovakia
only recently emerged as an autonomous nation in November, 1992, on
the heels of the overthrow of Communism by Czechoslovakia in 1989.309
2.

Legal Framework of the Slovak Republic

The representative democracy established in Slovakia is parliamentary in form, and structured by a written constitution. 3 10 The parliamentary system typically vests the executive power in a prime minister, who
is dependent upon the confidence of parliament to retain executive control. 3 11 The president has a symbolic role as head of state but he may act
in his capacity as referee or mediator to resolve critical conflicts between
the legislature and the executive. 312 Thus, parliamentary democracies
differ markedly from presidential democracies because the latter form
307 Martin Btitora, Volunteerism as a MultidimensionalPhenomenon, in NONPROFIT SECTOR AND VOLUNTEERING IN SLOVAxrJ 13 (1995).
308 Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism in East-CentralEurope: Some Negative Lessons

from the American Experience, in CONSTrruTIONALISM AND POLrTcs 17 (Irena Grudzinska
Gross ed., 1993) ("Slovakia had no history of national autonomy prior to the formation of
Czechoslovakia in the aftermath of World War I. Slovakia's only prior history of independent
statehood come during World War II, when the Nazis established a fascist Slovakian puppet
regime.").
309 See Peter Kresdk, The Government Structure in the New Slovak Republic, 4 TULSA J
COMP & Ir'LL. 1 (1996) (overview of the steps leading up to independent Slovak statehood).
310 See id. at 8-12.
311 See id. at
312 See id. at

8.
10.
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divides power horizontally among the branches of government while the
313
former vests pre-eminent power in the parliament.
This tendency toward unifying power in one branch is exacerbated
in the Slovak version of parliamentary democracy by the fact that the
31 4
legislature, the Parliament, is unicameral rather than bicameral.
Hence, the checks and balances associated with the American form of
presidential democracy and with other versions of the parliamentary
form have been absent from the Slovakian four-year experience with
democratic statehood.3 1 5 This constitutional framework has served the
purposes of the current Prime Minister in his efforts to curtail the development of the nonprofit sector in Slovakia because it unifies political
316
power-hence legislative domination-under his control.
3.

The 1996 Slovak Law on Foundations-A Benchmark of
Animus Toward the Nonprofit Sector

The current Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Vladimir
Meciar, 31 7 does not enjoy a reputation for devotion to democratic or
human rights principles. As an ex-communist who maintains close ties
with Russia, 3 18 who is reputed to take violent measures against his rivals 319 and who is blamed for Slovakia's diminished chances of joining
both NATO and the European Union (E.U.), 320 he is also credited with
passage of recent legislation exhibiting substantial hostility to the development of a vigorous nonprofit sector. 32 1 This legislation, A Law of the
Slovak National Councilfrom May, 1996, on Foundations ('Foundation
id. at 12.
See id.
315 See id. at 13, 17, 32.
316 See infra discussion Part IV.D.3.
317 See Kr6sak, supranote 309, at 2. Mr. Meciar was also the first Prime Minister of the
Slovak Republic and he has returned to that position after two brief hiatuses. See id.
318 See Slovakia's Chance of Joining E.U. Shrinking, CzEcH NEws AGENcY, CTK National News Wire, Nov. 25, 1996; Slovakia: Nice New Friends,EcONOMsr, Dec. 21, 1996, at
64; The Economist article characterizes Meciar as Slovakia's "thuggish prime minister" and
states that his actions against his opponent, Slovakia's president, Michel Kovac ("who is the
last main bulwark between the prime minister and untrammeled power") constitute "a direct
attack on Slovakian democracy." Id. The article also notes that the Prime Minister's policies
promote close ties with Russia in terms of bilateral trade, internal support for "Russia's business mafia," and an alliance between the two countries' secret service. Id. The Czech News
Agency story notes that Meciar has turned a deaf ear to E.U. and Council of Europe entreaties
to "return to the path of democracy." Id. And it concludes "Western politicians have long
believed that Slovakia's chances of joining the E.U. were smaller and smaller in spite of a
credible record of economic growth." Id.
319 See id.
313 See
314

320 See id.
321

See id.
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Law"), 322 restricts the development of the nonprofit sector, particularly
small, marginalized, grass-roots organizations, in several important respects. For example, it not only requires a minimum initial endowment
as start-up capital, but it also freezes that endowment floor by requiring
323
that it be maintained throughout the life of the organization.
Slovak law generally distinguishes between an association (an organization premised solely on membership) and a foundation (an entity
that owns property). 324 Thus, the Foundation Law defines a foundation
as "the intentional assembly of property, money, securities, and other
assets that can be valued in currency, . . . which was determined by the
founder to serve a generally beneficial goal. ' 32 5 It states further that
"[y]ields from the property of a foundation and other revenues of a foundation can be used only for support of the generally beneficial goals
['generally beneficial goals' is nowhere expressly defined] for which the
326
foundation was established.
A foundation is established in particular for the purpose
of development of spiritual values, for the realization
and protection of human rights or other humanitarian
goals, for the protection and creation of the environment,
protection of natural and cultural values, and for the pro32 7
tection of health and support of education.
Thus, the Slovak Foundation Law targets the full spectrum of nonprofit
organizations formed for myriad public and mutual purposes that are familiar to the American nonprofit landscape. But notice that the investment capital ("basic assets") floor and the freeze on those assets are
requirements that can easily disadvantage the small, grass-roots organizations to the point of extinction. They literally cannot survive in this
high-dollar legislative climate.
322 See zfkon 6. 2-11/1996 S.b. (A copy of the legislation is available from the author.);
JUDr. Zuzana Magurova, Legislation Concerning NGOs in Slovak Republic, PRAVNY OzoR
(1996) (English translation version on file with the author).
323 See zkon 6. 4(2) & (4)/1996 S.b.:
(2) The basic assets ...of a foundation are the property invested at the estab-

lishment of a foundation must be at least 10,000 Slovak Crowns [about $3001 and
within the period of 6 months it must be increased to at least 100,000 Slovak Crowns
[about $3,000].
(4) The activity of a foundation must not reduce its basic assets.
Id. (Copy on file with author).
324 The author is indebted to JUDr. Zuzana Magurova for her understanding of the legal
framework for nonprofit organizations in Slovakia. See Magurova, supra note 277.
325 Zdkon 6. 2.1/1996 S.b.
326 Id. at 2.3/1996 S.b.
327 Id. at 3/1996 S.b.
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Another set of provisions in the Foundation Law establishes draconian registration 328 and administration 329 requirements. Again, these onerous administrative burdens fall most heavily on small, underfunded
grass-roots organizations. The Foundation Law did several things. First,
it countermanded the existing legal framework which had been generally
favorable to nonprofit organizations.3 30 Second, it elicited significant internal and international criticism.3 31 Internally, the Gremium of the
Third Sector, an umbrella organization representing the nonprofit sector
in Slovakia, submitted its own counterproposal (The Civil Bill on Foundations)3 32 which diluted the capital investment provisions and simplified the registration and administration requirements. 333 The
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law ("ICNL," headquartered in
334
Washington, D.C.) also submitted its critique of the Foundation Law
which paralleled, in many respects, the Gremium's concerns. The
Slovak and international press also weighed in with their own critical
assessments. 335 Significantly, the European Commission which has
oversight duties with regard to the associate status of Eastern and Central
Countries for admission to the E.U., 33 6 commissioned the European Cen337
tre to submit a report of its assessment of the Foundation Law.
See id. at 11/1996 S.b.
See id. at 10/1996 S.b.
330 See Magurova, supra note 322, at 86 and accompanying text; JUDr. Magurova notes
that there is no general statute covering all nonprofit organizations. Thus, while the Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees the right to associate (Article 28), different types of
nonprofit associations are treated under separate provisions of the Slovak Code. The basic
divisions are: associations (entities comprised of members); foundations (entities which also
own property) formed for generally beneficent purposes; religious organizations; and political
parties.
Thus, the Civil Code at article 18 generally regulates associations and foundations including trade unions but expressly excludes coverage of political parties, religious organizations
and for-profit associations. Proprietary associations are regulated pursuant to the provisions of
the Commercial Code (copy on file with the author). Some organizations have quasi-governmental status and are regulated separately. Tax law also treats nonprofit organizations according to the type of tax and type of organization. There is no across-the-board exempt status for
qualified nonprofit organizations. See id. A comparative study of Slovak tax law and U.S. tax
law with regard to nonprofits is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that in many
respects they extend comparable tax breaks. See id.
331 See id. at 86-87.
332 A copy of the counterproposal is on file with the author.
333 See Richard Lewis, ParliamentPasses Foundation Bill, Third Sector Still Not Satisfied, THE SLOVAK SPECrATOR, June 5, 1996, at 3.
334 A copy of this critique is on file with the author.
335 See, e.g., Tom Reynolds, Some FoundationsMay Founderfrom the New Law, Tim
SLOVAK SPECTATOR, June 5, 1996, at 3.
336 See supra notes 198-215 and accompanying text.
337 Review and Recommendations: Proposed Slovak Law on Foundations,prepared for
the European Commission by Bradley D. Gallop & Eric Kemp for the European Foundation
Centre (copy on file with author).
328

329
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Generally, the Centre advised the Slovak parliament to reconsider
the Law with a view to bringing it in line with the spirit and structure of
E.U. law regarding nonprofit associations and foundations. 338 In particular, it recommended deletion of the minimum initial endowment requirement and restrictions on the use of initial endowments, and it called for
simplification and liberalization of administrative and regulation requirements. 339 It counseled the Slovak Parliament to "recognize the considerable potential of foundations in building social economy [what is now
called 'social capital'], the bedrock of the European Union's pluralistic
democracy.' 34° In some detail, it chronicled the "role of social economy
in building civil society. ' 34 1 It noted that the nonprofit sector has burgeoned in Member States of the European Union (E.U.), now representing five percent of Gross National Product (GNP) in those states and
employing ten million professionals throughout the E.U. 342 Increasingly,
said the Report, the nonprofit sector is recognized as enabling citizens to
play important roles in public life along with the government (public
sector) and business (private sector) communities.3 43 As a consequence,
it stated that the European Commission-in conjunction with other E.U.
institutions and non-governmental organizations (N.G.O.)-is committed
to developing legal environments in member and associate states where
the nonprofit sector can thrive. 344 Reaction to the Slovak Foundation
Law was uniformly critical within E.U. and nonprofit circles.
Passage of the Foundation Law is strong evidence that the nonprofit
sector (in all its manifold aspects, but especially the small grass-roots
groups) is viewed as a threat to the hegemony of this authoritarian regime. The fact that Prime Minister Meciar believed that Foundation
Law's passage was important enough to risk international opprobrium
and possible exclusion from the Community, which is in his nation's
economic interests to join, demonstrates the importance of the nonprofit
sector. 345 In that respect the four-year experience of statehood in
Slovakia mirrors the historical lessons of the Western tradition. A vigorous nonprofit sector challenges hegemony by creating alternative sources
of power which can serve as checks on excessive exercises of power in
346
the private and public sectors.
338 See id. at 1.

339 See id. at 1, 3.
340 Id. at 1.
341 Id.

342 See id. at 2.
343
344
345
346

See id.
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id.
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In fact, the vitality of the nonprofit sector in Slovakia is palpable
and notable. The fact that the nonprofit sector in Slovakia "virtually did
347
not exist ...just a few years ago" makes its vigor today remarkable.
The sector, however, does have historical antecedents. During the second half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth
century the proliferation of nonprofit associations in Czechoslovakia was
significant. "'Associational life was speeded up by the industrial revolution ...and it especially flourished in towns and cities."' 348 "The associations served as tools for social identification [on the community,
group or professional level]; they promoted social communication" and
cohesion. 349 "[They] provided space for political participation and
through their educational function they contributed to a general rise in
civilization and democracy. '350 The experience of a burgeoning nonprofit sector, however, was subsequently overshadowed by the two totalitarian regimes that ruled the region sequentially. Under Nazism, one
party had a monopoly of public power.35 1 The nonprofit sector was obliterated as an autonomous source of power.35 2 Similarly, the Communist regime suppressed not only entrepreneurial association, but all forms
of nonprofit association and networks that sought independence from
state control. 353 Power was once again unified within a paternalistic
state. The "ethos of co-participation, co-responsibility [and] altruism...
354
[were replaced by] the spread of apathy.
With the success of the Czechoslovak ("Velvet") Revolution and
the subsequent division of Czechoslovakia into two separate nationstates, the proliferation of non'profit organizations in Slovakia has resumed. The growth of the sector is indicated by a statistical report showing 6,000 nonprofit organizations registered in Slovakia in 1993,
compared with 9,800 the following year.3 55 Recall that this growth takes
place in a political environment hostile to the sector 356 and against a
recent historical experience spanning over forty years which did nothing
to inculcate the habits of nonprofit associational life.
347 Bdtora, supra note 307, at 13 (Based on two studies undertaken in 1994, the report
was commissioned by EUROVOL, an institution conducting a research assessment of volunteering work in ten European countries [Great Britain, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany,
Denmark, The Netherlands, Ireland, Slovakia, and Sweden]).

348 Id.at 14 (quoting Slovak historian E. Mannord).
349 Id.

350 Id.
351 See id.
352 See id.

353 See id.
354 Id. at 14-16.

355 See id.
at 17.
356 "Some political observers assume that Meciar's comeback.., has brought into the
realm of politics a special amalgam of authoritarianism which embodies both the pre-war traditionalist nationalist populism and the post-war socialist collectivism." Id.
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CODA-EXPERIENCE IS THE PREFERRED TEACHER (REPORTS OF
THE DEMISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY MAY BE PREMATURE)

Studies of the sector in Slovakia suggest that, absent punitive and

restrictive legislation unapologetically designed to diminish the sector,
its development and contours display a marked similarity with nonprofit
sectors in other democracies. Predictably, nonprofit sectors' capacity to
play the same kinds of roles in developing and sustaining a representative democracy is comparable. Indeed, the exigencies of postmodern industrial societies make the role of nonprofits pivotal. Habermas
observed that in advanced industrial societies the proprietary and government sectors tend to expand their spheres of influence and with them
their dominant norms: instrumentality and bureaucratization,
357
respectively.
These norms increasingly shape public discourse and private values
to the diminution or exclusion of values and norms not premised on

profit, efficiency or impersonality, thereby, decreasing a sense of responsibility and personal commitment. Without a vibrant nonprofit sector to
deflect the apathy and passivity engendered by public and private monoliths, a return to paternalism and unified power seems inevitable. 35 8 Further, a strong nonprofit sector can serve to counteract the isolation of the
postmodern predicament by providing a matrix of overlapping commonalities 359 and to replace the old dichotomies of natural law with a new
'360
"paradigm of pluralism.
CONCLUSION
The nonprofit sector is at a critical juncture in America. Recent
legislative proposals may herald a change in the legal structure governing
nonprofits. Since a cornerstone of that structure is the federal law conferring tax-exempt status on qualified nonprofits, many of the proposals

for change target that law. In response, most of the legal scholarship has
analyzed the sector from the perspective of classical economic theory.
But in order to construct an adequate evaluation of current legislative
357 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRucrURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS socIErY (Thomas Burger trans., 1989); R. Wuthnow,

The Voluntary Sector: Legacy of the Past, Hope for the Future, in BETwEEN STATES AND
MARKErs: THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3-29 (1991).
358 See HABERMAS, supra note 357, at 67.
359 See WALZER, supra note 130, at 88-92.
360 BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 137, at 42; but see Kenneth Janda, New Constitutions
andModels of Democracy: The Problem of the Majority, in CONSTTmTONALISM AND POLrICS

17 (Irena Grudzinska Gross ed., 1993). Janda explains that whereas pluralities see society as
organized into myriad "overlapping and cross-cutting nongovernmental (but not non-political)
interest groups," Eastern and Central Europe lacks the extensive network of voluntary associations that is required for a pluralist democracy. Id.
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proposals or of the existing legal regime, the analysis must go beyond
economic theory and consider the substantial role the nonprofit sector
has played in the American form of representative democracy and in the
development of the Western political tradition on which it relies.
The contributions the nonprofit sector makes to the American polity
can be subsumed within these categories: (1) participation in the sector
teaches the skills of self-rule in the form of consensus-building, decisionmaking, and concerted action; (2) these three skills in turn develop the
habits of compromise, reciprocal respect, tolerance and civility; and (3)
the sector itself, both as a totality and through the manifold activities of
its constituent organizations, serves to mediate the space between the
individual and the other two sectors (governmental and entrepreneurial)
by giving "voice," access, and forum to disparate views and goals and by
acting as a ballast-a stabilizing or balancing influence-against overreaching by the other two sectors.
The success of the Western tradition in developing democratic institutions is attributable to its ability, over time, to fragment power. The
nonprofit sector played a pivotal role in this historical achievement because it harbors disparate point-sources of associational autonomy.
This fragmentation of power in the West stands in stark contrast to
the Eastern political tradition which has been characterized by a unified
power structure and paternalism. Indeed, the fragmentation of power is
considered the sine qua non of the democratization process in East-Central European countries emerging from Communist domination. The development of a strong nonprofit sector is considered indispensable to that
process. Recent legislation in Slovakia illustrates the point obversely.
There, an authoritarian prime minister has obliged the parliament to enact legislation designed to constrict the size and diversity of Slovakia's
nonprofit sector and to preclude the proliferation of small, grass-roots
organizations. Prior to enactment of the legislation, the Slovak nonprofit
sector offered abundant evidence of its vitality and growth. Thus, even
in this Central European country where-given its traditions. and political
antecedents-the existence of a nonprofit sector strong enough to pose a
threat to authoritarianism would seem most problematic, the importance
of the sector in developing a representative democracy is evident.
In light of the foregoing, any attempt to evaluate either the current
legal framework covering nonprofits or legislative proposals to alter that
framework must consider whether the legislation impedes or preserves
the capacity of the sector to play those roles which are vital to the survival of a representative democracy.

